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I. INTRODUCTION
D ELINQUENT tax returns invite the imposition of late filing
penalties.' Executors2 and others charged with the duty of
filing estate tax returns are discovering the high price of tardi-
ness, even if it seemingly occurs through no fault of their own. A
major source of difficulty has been the Government's stringent
interpretation of the "reasonable cause" escape hatch for avoid-
ing the penalty on estate tax returns that are filed late. Of partic-
ular interest are those instances where the "reasonable cause"
claim is based solely on the executor's reliance upon representa-
t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; LL.M., Northwestern Uni-
versity; J.D., SUNY-Buffalo; B.S., Cornell University.
1. See I.R.C. § 6651(a) (1985). This section imposes an "addition to the
tax" for unexcused late filings of tax returns. For the text of I.R.C. § 6651(a),
see infra note 7.
2. The term "executor" is defined in the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C.
§ 2203 (1985). The Code defines "executor" as the executor or administrator
of the estate, or, if there is no executor or administrator, then any person in
actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent. Id.
3. See id. § 6651(a). This section provides in part that a penalty shall not be
imposed for a failure to file promptly where "it is shown that such failure is due
to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." Id.
(525)
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tions and actions of counsel. 4 The Government has turned a deaf
ear to executors making such an argument, and denied their re-
quests for penalty abatements predicated on this theory. Taxpay-
ers pursuing the matter in the courts have encountered assorted
reactions. Recently, in Boyle v. United States5 the Supreme Court
established a "bright line" test for resolving these cases by adopt-
ing the Government's position that reliance on counsel does not
constitute reasonable cause for late filing.6 The Court stopped
short, however, of creating an absolute per se rule. Consequently,
Boyle may not destine all future "reliance on counsel" claims to a
similar fate. Although the death knell has not been rung, surely a
nearly fatal blow has been leveled at executors seeking to avoid
delinquency penalties incurred through the inept advice or ac-
tions of counsel. The impact of Boyle will weigh heavily on coun-
selors and executors alike. The importance of its consequences,
and the possible boundaries to which it is confined, warrant scru-
tiny in order to ascertain whether the Court has prescribed the
most appropriate remedy to cure the perceived woe.
II. BACKDROP
A. "Addition" to the Tax
Through its turgid language, section 6651(a)(1) 7 imposes an
4. For the purposes of this article, "counsel" includes attorneys, account-
ants, agents, or anyone else who is permitted to give advice or is enrolled to
practice before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under Treasury Dept. Circ.
No. 230. See Part 10-Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 31 C.F.R.
§§ 10.00-10.93(a) (1985). Sections 10.3(a) and (b) specifically authorize attor-
neys and accountants, respectively, to practice before the IRS merely by declar-
ing current qualification in either profession. Id. § 10.3(a)-(b). Section 10.3(c)
authorizes those enrolled as agents to practice before the IRS. Id. § 10.3(c).
Section 10.4(a) intimates that "practice before the IRS" includes the filing of
returns, and § 10.22(a) imposes upon those authorized to practice before the
IRS a standard of due diligence in the "preparing or assisting in the preparation
of, approving andfiling returns." Id. § 10.22(a) (emphasis supplied).
5. 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985).
6. Id. at 693-94.
7. The section provides:
(a) Addition to the tax-In case of failure-
(1) to file any return required under authority of subchapter A of
chapter 61 (other than part thereof), subchapter A of chapter 51 (relat-
ing to distilled spirits, wines, and beer), or of subchapter A of chapter
52 (relating to tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, and cigarette papers and
tubes), or of subchapter A of chapter 53 (relating to machine guns and
certain other firearms), on the date prescribed therefor (determined
with regard to any extension of time for filing), unless it is shown that
such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect,
there shall be added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such
return 5 percent of the amount of such tax if the failure is for not more
[Vol. 31: p. 525
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addition to the tax shown on the return of five percent of the
amount of such tax for each month (or fraction thereof) the re-
turn is late. The maximum addition is twenty-five percent regard-
less of how long after its due date the return is filed. 8 Although
not specifically mentioned, estate tax returns are subject to these
rules. 9 The current version of this provision is not drastically dif-
ferent from its precedessors, though some changes have
occurred.
Penalty provisions, including "additions to the tax," can be
traced back to tax statutes of the Civil War era.' 0 In the early
statutes the addition to the tax for delinquent filing was set at a
mandatory fifty percent irrespective of whether the return was
one month or one year late. I The phase-in to a twenty-five per-
cent maximum in five percent increments did not enter the scene
until the mid-1930's.' 2 Although the late filing addition to estate
taxes was originally segregated from its income tax counterpart,' 3
additions to all taxes 14 for late filing were eventually incorporated
than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for each additional month
or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding
25 percent in the aggregate ....
I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) (1985).
8. Id.
9. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(1) applies to returns required to be filed under sub-
chapter A of chapter 61 of the Code. See id. § 6018, which requires the filing of
estate tax returns, is found in subchapter A of chapter 61, thus estate tax returns
are within the purview of the penalty section. See I.R.C. § 6018 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Act ofJune 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 226 (1864). For a
historical discussion of the delinquency penalties, see infra note 15.
11. See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 14, 13 Stat. 226 (1864). See also
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 451, § 16, 39 Stat. 774 (1916). Section 16 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1916 reads in pertinent part:
In case of any failure to make and file a return or list within the
time prescribed by law or by the collector, the commissioner of Internal
Revenue shall add to the tax, fifty percentum of its amount except that,
when a return is voluntarily and without notice from the collector filed
after such time and it is shown that the failure to file it was due to rea-
sonable cause and not to willfull neglect, no such addition shall be
made to the tax.
Id.
12. See Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 829, § 406, 49 Stat. 1027 (1935).
13. Prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the delin-
quency penalties for income taxes were found in § 291 of the Code, whereas the
delinquency penalties for estate and gift tax returns were found in § 3512(d)(1).
See I.R.C. § 291(s)(1) (1939); id. § 3512(d)(1).
14. I.R.C. § 6651(a) applies to all income and transfer tax returns, and to
returns for taxes relating to alcohol, tobacco, and firearms. See I.R.C. § 6651 (a)
(1985). However, § 6651(a) does not apply to information returns required by
chapter 61, part III. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 418-19,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4025, 4566.
1986] 527
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in one section. 15
Of interesting historical note, all versions of these sections
spurn use of the term "penalty," referring to the price to be paid
for late filing as an "addition" to the tax. Is a distinction being
made? Seemingly not since the "addition" is considered by the
drafters to be a penalty. Elsewhere in the section, additions and
penalties are equated, 16 and the two are treated as being one and
the same. The legal community refers to the "additions" as pen-
alties, and to the "addition" of section 6651(a)(1) more specifi-
cally as the "failure to file" or "delinquency" penalty.' 7
Despite its longevity, section 6651 (a) has little detailed legis-
lative history. Nowhere is the precise reason for instituting the
delinquency penalty stated. The courts, however, have provided
some insight. In Helvering v. Mitchell, I8 for example, the Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of tax penalties is to protect the
revenue.' 9 Later, in Spies v. United States,20 the Court noted the
importance of punctuality to the federal fisc and viewed the pen-
alty provisions as a means of assuring the same in that they induce
timely filings of returns and the concomitant receipt of revenue.2 1
15. See I.R.C. § 6651(a) (1985). The separate delinquency provisions were
finally brought together into this section in 1954. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736,
68A Stat. 821 (1954). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 540-4 1, reprinted
in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 5240 (§ 6051 is applicable to all
taxes for which a taxpayer is required to file a return).
16. See I.R.C. § 6651(b) (1985) ("penalty" imposed on net amount due).
17. See, e.g., Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Returns, 23
UCLA L. REV. 637, 677 (1976) (analyzing § 6651 under the heading of"Admin-
istration of Delinquency Penalty and Judicial Review" and categorizing it as a
"failure to file penalty"); Harris & Warner, Estate Late Filing Penalty Under Section
6651: A New Stricter Interpretation, 57 TAXES 275, 276 (1979) (labelling
§ 6651 (a)(1) as "Penalty Provision"); Preston, Reliance on Attorney Defense to Late
Filing Penalty Increasingly Being Rejected by Courts, 9 EST. PLANNING 280 (1982)
(characterizing § 6651(a) as provision setting forth lateness penalty).
18. 303 U.S. 391 (1958).
19. Id. at 401. The Supreme Court stated:
The remedial character of sanctions imposing additions to a tax
has been made clear by this Court in passing upon similar legislation.
They are provided primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the
revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of
investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Court has made similar statements in other cases. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687, 690 (1985) ("Congress' purpose in the prescribed civil
penalty was to ensure timely filing of tax returns to the end that tax liability will
be ascertained and paid promptly."); Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214,
221 (1893) (tax penalty against under-valuation of import merchandise was
designed to prevent efforts to escape legal rates of duty).
20. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
21. Id. at 495. The Court stated that "taxpayers' neglect or deceit may prej-
528 [Vol. 31: p. 525
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In the same vein the Boyle Court stated that "the prompt payment
of taxes is imperative to the Government," 22 and suggested that
in a voluntary system rigid adherence to strict filing standards en-
courages achievement of that objective.23 The conclusion is
clear. The penalties are designed to guarantee the Government
prompt receipt of taxes due. Failure to comply with the deadlines
will cost the dilatory taxpayer. Presumably, a five percent per
month addition is a sufficient incentive to prompt timely returns,
but the twenty-five percent cap prevents the charge from being
considered confiscatory. This seems a sensible and not overly on-
erous viewpoint.
Notwithstanding its underlying purpose, however, the addi-
tion to tax is not always imposed. Relief is available for those
tardy filers who can show that the late filing was the result of "rea-
sonable cause and not due to willful neglect." 24 It is well settled
that to avoid the penalty the taxpayer must make a positive show-
ing of reasonable cause and not just prove a lack of willful ne-
glect. 25 More often than not the crucial element of the equation
is "reasonable cause," a term not easily reducible to simple defi-
udice the orderly and punctual administration of the system as well as the reve-
nues themselves." Id. Recognizing the congressional objective behind the tax
penalties, the Court went on to note that "Congress has imposed a variety of
sanctions for the protection of the system and the revenues." Id.
22. 105 S. Ct. at 692. For a detailed discussion of the Boyle case, see infra
notes 285-308 and accompanying text.
23. 105 S. Ct. at 692. The Court stated that "the Government has millions
of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of self-assessment in the initial calcula-
tion of tax simply cannot work on any other basis than one of strict filing stan-
dards." Id.
24. See I.R.C. § 6651(a) (1985). There is considerable case law refusing to
impose penalties on late filers where their filings are the result of "reasonable
cause" and not "willful neglect." See, e.g., Willis v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 134
(4th Cir. 1984) (inadvertent error by taxpayer's secretary-comptroller in mislay-
ing tax return and failing to mail it in a timely fashion constituted "reasonable
cause"); Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979) (in certain
circumstances, reliance upon counsel may constitute "reasonable cause"); San-
derling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d Cir. 1978) (reasonable
cause existed where taxpayer filed return after due date because of misinforma-
tion by accountant as to actual due date).
25. See, e.g., Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 1148, 1149 (6th
Cir. 1974) (§ 6651 (a) places burden upon taxpayer to prove that failure to timely
file federal tax return was "due to reasonable cause and not due to willful ne-
glect"); Rubber Research, Inc. v. Commissioner, 422 F.2d 1402, 1407 (8th Cir.
1970) (burden of showing existence of reasonable cause and absence of willful
neglect is on taxpayer); West Virginia Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 851,
860 (1960) (forgetting to file tax returns may not be due to willful neglect but
nevertheless does not constitute reasonable cause); Hornsby v. Commissioner,
26 B.T.A. 591, 593 (1932) (penalty for tardy filing may only be avoided by show-
ing filing conditions of reasonable cause and not willful neglect).
1986] 529
5
Morris: Reliance on Counsel as Reasonable Cause: To the Back Burner after
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
nition. The Government's view of what constitutes reasonable
cause is found in the broad statement: "reasonable cause exists if
the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence and
was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed
time." 26 This open-ended pronouncement has spawned a variety
of bases for establishing reasonable cause for the late filing of es-
tate tax returns. 27 Perhaps the most controversial basis has been
the "attorney reliance" theory used by executors to avoid the
penalty.
B. The Executor's Role
To fully appreciate the arguments both for and against the
"attorney reliance" theory,28 it will provide valuable to identify
the executor's role in the estate tax administration process.
Among the responsibilities of an executor is the duty imposed by
the Internal Revenue Code to file an estate tax return. 29 The stat-
26. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651(c)(1) (1984).
27. The IRS has announced eight circumstances that may constitute "rea-
sonable cause" for delay in filing. They are: (1) unavoidable postal delays,
(2) the timely filing of the correct form with the wrong office, (3) the taxpayer's
reliance on erroneous advice of an IRS office or employee, (4) the death or seri-
ous illness of the taxpayer or a member of his immediate family, (5) the tax-
payer's unavoidable absences, (6) destruction by casualty of the taxpayer's
records or place of business, (7) failure of the IRS to furnish the taxpayer with
the necessary forms in a timely fashion, and (8) the inability of an IRS represen-
tative to meet with the taxpayer when the taxpayer makes a timely visit to an IRS
office in an attempt to secure information or aid in preparation of a return. IN-
TERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 4350(24), 22.2-2(2) (Mar. 20, 1980) (Audit
Technique Manual for Estate Tax Examiners).
Additionally, taxpayers have succeeded in avoiding the delinquency penalty
in other situations. See, e.g., Philad Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 565, 570
(1942) (reasonable cause for delay existed where taxpayer's request for exten-
sion of time was refused two days after return was due and taxpayer filed return
four days after extension was refused); Alba v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9230 (1980) (reasonable cause found when taxpayer believed in good
faith that extension of time granted by Commissioner meant that she did not
have to file return or pay tax until she could afford to do so); E. Comenout, Jr. v.
Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,040 (1982) (reasonable cause found where
taxpayer, a Geunault Indian, in good faith believed he was exempt from taxa-
tion); Thelma A. Ramos v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (P-H) 55,048 (1955)
(reasonable cause found where taxpayer thought that return filed by her former
husband was joint return). For a general discussion of reasonable cause under
I.R.C. § 6651, see MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 55.21 (1984);
B. BITTKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 114.3.2 (1981).
28. For a discussion of the attorney reliance theory, see infra notes 43-196
and accompanying text.
29. See I.R.C. § 6018 (1985). Section 6018 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Returns by executor.-
(1) Citizens or residents.-In all cases where the gross estate at
the death of a citizen or resident exceeds $600,000, the executor
530 [Vol. 31: p. 525
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utory definition of "executor" is broader than the traditional
common law concept 30 to ensure that there is someone obligated
to file the return. When required 3 the return is due nine
months from the date of the decedent's death.32 Failure to file on
time will trigger the delinquency penalty. 33 The executor is also
charged with the duty to pay the tax.34 Perhaps it would be better
to state that the duty is to see that the tax is paid since the estate
tax is not normally considered the personal, individual liability of
the executor. 35 Despite the statutory wording, executors are not
usually expected to account for a decedent's estate tax liabilities
out of their personal funds. 36 The statute provides a way for ex-
shall make a return with respect to the estate tax imposed by subti-
tle B.
Id. § 6018(a).
30. At common law the term "executor" is used to describe the one named
or appointed in the will to carry out the provisions of the will. See, e.g., In re
Silverman's Estate, 6 Ill. App. 3d 225, 285 N.E.2d 548 (1972); Lichtenfels v.
North Carolina, 260 N.C. 146, 132 S.E.2d 360 (1963); In re Watkin's Estate, 113
Vt. 126, 30 A.2d 305 (1943). The Code, however, takes a broader view of what
constitutes an executor for estate tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 2203 (1985) (execu-
tor may be administrator, or if there is none, any person in actual or constructive
possession of any of decedent's property).
31. I.R.C. § 6018 requires an estate tax or its equivalent to be filed when
the decedent's gross estate exceeds a specified statutory dollar limit. I.R.C.
§ 6018 (1985). These limits correspond to the taxable transfer equivalents of
the unified credit. Compare id. with I.R.C. § 2010 (1984) (united credit against
estate tax). The dollar limits currently are $500,000 for 1986 and $600,000 for
1987 and thereafter. I.R.C. § 6018(a)(3) (1985).
32. I.R.C. § 6075 (1985). Although estate tax returns are due nine months
from the date of the decedent's death, extensions are available upon proper ap-
plication. Id. § 6081. The late filing penalty only applies to returns filed after
the expiration of nine months plus any extension period granted. Id. § 6651 (a).
33. Id. § 6651. For the relevant language of § 6651, see supra note 7.
34. I.R.C. § 2002 (1985).
35. See R. STEPHENS, M. MAXFIELD & S. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GirT
TAXATION § 2002, at 2.02 (5th ed. 1983). The authors maintain that an execu-
tor should incur personal liability only for a fiduciary impropriety with respect to
payment of estate tax. Id.
36. Id. The authors of Federal Estate and Gift Taxation assert that it is unac-
ceptable to view the Code as requiring the executor to use his own funds to pay
estate taxes "in light of other statutory provisions that fasten personal liability
onto the executor [only] in specified circumstances." Id.
One such statutory provision may be found in title 31 of the United States
Code, which governs money and finance. Section 3713 of title 31 sets out the
circumstances dictating priority of Government claims over all others. See 31
U.S.C. § 3713 (1982). Regarding the liability of an executor of an estate for
noncompliance with the statute, § 3713(b) provides:
A representative of a person or an estate (except a trustee acting
under title 11) paying any part of a debt of the person or estate before
paying a claim of the Government is liable to the extent of the payment
for unpaid claims of the Government.
Id. § 3713(b).
1986]
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ecutors to be released from any possibility of personal liability.
This is achieved through a request which seeks a prompt audit of
the return and release of liability for any tax assessable beyond
the liability determined by such an audit.3 7 But even absent such
a request, executors can generally rest assured that the estate tax
liability will be paid from the decedent's assets.38 Executors
must, however, take care when paying debts or making estate dis-
tributions because they can become personally liable to the Gov-
ernment if there are insufficient after-debt or post-distribution
assets to pay the tax.3 9 It would seem that this potential adverse
consequence could be easily avoided with a modicum of prudent
estate administration. Thus, insofar as estate taxes are con-
cerned, the executor is charged primarily with the duty of seeing
For a discussion of other provisions fastening personal liability upon an ex-
ecutor in specified circumstances, see R. STEPHENS, M. MAXFIELD & S. LIND,
supra note 35, § 2204, at 8.03[l].
37. See I.R.C. § 2204(a) (1985). Section 2204(a) provides:
(a) General rule.-If the executor makes written application to the
Secretary for determination of the amount of the tax and discharge
from personal liability therefor, the Secretary (as soon as possible, and
in any event within 9 months after the making of such application, or, if
the application is made before the return is filed, then within 9 months
after the return is filed, but not after the expiration of the period pre-
scribed for the assessment of the tax in section 6501) shall notify the
executor of the amount of the tax. The executor, on payment of the
amount of which he is notified (other than any amount the time for
payment of which is extended under section 6161, 6163, or 6166), and
on furnishing any bond which may be required for any amount for
which the time for payment is extended, shall be discharged from per-
sonal liability for any deficiency in tax thereafter found to be due and
shall be entitled to a receipt or writing showing such discharge.
Id.
For a discussion of this procedure, see R. STEPHENS, M. MAXFIELD & S.
LIND, supra note 35, § 2204, at 8.03[2].
38. See I.R.C. § 2205 (1985). Section 2205 provides:
If the tax or any part thereof is paid by, or collected out of, that
part of the estate passing to or in the possession of any person other
than the executor in his capacity as such, such person shall be entitled
to reimbursement out of any part of the estate still undistributed or by
a just and equitable contribution by the persons whose interest in the
estate of the decedent would have been reduced if the tax had been
paid before the distribution of the estate or whose interest is subject to
equal or prior liability for the payment of taxes, debts, or other charges
against the estate, it being the purpose and intent of this chapter that so far as is
practicable and unless otherwise directed by the will of the decedent the tax shall be
paid out of the estate before its distribution.
Id. (emphasis added).
39. See id. § 3713(b) (1985). For the text of this section, see supra note 36.
See also Miller, The Fiduciary s Personal Liability for Deficiencies in Federal Income, Estate
and Gift Taxes of a Decedent or Decedent's Estate, 11 GONZ. L. REV. 431 (1976) (fiduci-
aries such as executors should be aware that they may incur personal liability for
tax obligations of decedent and his estate following settlement and distribution).
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that the return is filed and the taxes are paid. Of course, implicit
in filing a return is the obligation to ensure it is properly exe-
cuted. This forces the executor to have a basic, if not sophisti-
cated, understanding of the estate tax and sometimes income
tax40 rules. It is unrealistic to expect lay executors to possess
such knowledge, and thus it is common practice for them to as-
sign this task to the attorney for the estate. Once the tax matters
are in the hands of counsel a crucial question rises, namely, what
duties remain with the executor with respect to these tax matters.
Does the Internal Revenue Code impose on executors an ongoing
duty making them guarantors of proper filing, or by retaining
counsel to handle the tax matters have executors pursued a pru-
dent path of ordinary business care which relieves them of that
obligation? The Government contends that the duty to file the
estate tax return is nondelegable and that although an executor
might secure assistance in executing the return the ultimate filing
obligation forever resides with him.4' Therefore, late returns in
those circumstances where the executor has delegated his filing
duty to counsel warrant imposition of the failure to file penalty.
Executors, however, argue that by obtaining putatively qualified
counsel to handle all estate tax matters they have met their re-
sponsibilities.42 They contend that a delinquent return resulting
from error of counsel constitutes reasonable cause for the estate
and should prevent the penalty from being assessed. The argu-
ments on both sides are compelling.
III. RELIANCE ON COUNSEL
A. The Taxpayer's Progress
Initially, executors who offered the "reliance on counsel"
("attorney reliance") theory as reasonable cause for delinquent
estate tax returns met with mixed success. For the most part the
40. The executor or other personal representative of an estate is required
to file an income tax return for the decedent for any year in which the estate
earns gross income in excess of $600. I.R.C. § 6012(a), (b) (1985).
41. A number of cases have held that an executor has a personal and non-
delegable duty to file a timely return, and that reliance on the mistaken advice of
counsel is not sufficient to constitute "reasonable cause" for failing to fulfill that
duty. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1983); Boev-
ing v. United States, 650 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1981); Millette & Assocs. v.
Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121, 124-25 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 899 (1979); Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957).
42. See, e.g., Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir.
1979); United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 1977); Haywood Lum-
ber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1950).
5331986]
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factual patterns of reported cases shared a common theme, with
successful executors usually being able to demonstrate that the
estate's attorney was more than merely an agent hired to file the
estate tax return.43 To demonstrate reasonable cause, generally
something other than relying on the attorney to secure a timely
filing of the estate return was required. 44 Before Boyle, the exact
dividing line delineating where reliance on counsel separated rea-
sonable cause from unexcused tardiness was not easily identi-
fied. 4 5 But the courts were willing to distinguish an executor's
reliance on counsel's substantive advice from mere procedural
(filing) assistance. 46 Whereas "reasonable cause" was consist-
ently found in instances of the former, taxpayer success in the
latter was problematical.
An early victory for the proponents of the "reliance on coun-
43. See, e.g., In re Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1953); Hatfried,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947).
44. See Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1981)
(where executor knows of due date for filing, he may not allege reliance on his
counsel as reasonable cause for his late filing); Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611
F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979). In Rohrabaugh, the Seventh Circuit held that reliance
upon counsel constituted reasonable cause only when: (1) the taxpayer is unfa-
miliar with the tax law; (2) the taxpayer makes full disclosure of all relevant facts
to the attorney that he relies upon, and maintains contact with the attorney from
time to time during the administration of the estate; and (3) the taxpayer has
otherwise exercised ordinary business care and prudence. Id. at 215, 219.
Additionally, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin held that "selecting a competent tax expert, supplying him with the
necessary information, and asking him to prepare proper returns" are all that
ordinary business care and prudence can reasonably demand. Giesen v. United
States, 364 F. Supp. 33, 36 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (citations omitted).
45. Compare Fleming v. United States, 648 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 1981)
("executor" knew of filing date, unsuccessful with reliance on counsel argument
as reasonable cause) and Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th
Cir. 1981) (taxpayer's reliance on attorney to file return did not constitute rea-
sonable cause where taxpayer made no effort to find out when return was due,
nor to follow up with his lawyer to make sure the return was not filed late) with
Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 219 (7th Cir. 1979) (inexperienced
taxpayer's reliance on counsel for timely filing and good faith attempt to have
return filed on time constituted "reasonable cause" for late filing). For a discus-
sion of Boyle's delineation of what may constitute reasonable cause, see infra
notes 286-95 and accompanying text.
46. See Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir. 1979). In
Rohrabaugh, the Seventh Circuit stressed that the taxpayer's unfamiliarity with
the tax law was significant in determining whether his reliance on counsel was
reasonable enough to constitute "reasonable cause" for the taxpayer's late fil-
ing. Id. See also In re Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953); Hatfried, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1942). In both Fisk's Estate and Hatfried,
the circuit courts emphasized that since the taxpayers relied on counsel for ad-
vice in complicated, technical legal matters with respect to the filing of tax re-
turns, reliance was sufficient to constitute a reasonable cause for the tardiness of
the filing. In re Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d at 359; Hatfried, 162 F.2d at 360.
[Vol. 31: p. 525
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sel" argument was won in Adeline McColgan.47 Ms. McColgan
served as the executrix of her brother's estate, the only asset of
which was an interest in a partnership. 48 Following the advice of
counsel that this interest was not taxable, an estate tax return was
not filed. 49 More than two years after her brother's death, the
taxpayer, for reasons not stated, filed an estate tax return upon
which the Government assessed the mandatory delinquency pen-
alty. 50 In the suit that ensued, the taxpayer continued to maintain
that the partnership interest was not taxable, 5' but the court ruled
otherwise. 52 The penalty, however, was abated. 53 In doing so,
the court took note of the executrix's unfamiliarity with the law
and her adherence to advice rendered by counsel to the effect that
a return was not due at all. 54 The court was moved by the fact
that the taxpayer believed her attorney's opinion that there were
no assets subject to estate taxation and consequently no tax re-
turn had to be filed.5 5 It concluded that "under the circum-
stances ... the failure to file ... on time... was due to reasonable
cause and not to wilful neglect." 56 This position was accepted by
47. 10 B.T.A. 958 (1928).
48. Id. at 959. The deceased had held a one-half interest in a partnership
engaged in the real estate and loan business. Id. The assets of the partnership
were composed of real estate and personal property and included an undivided
one-fourth interest in some tracts of land then subject to two life interests. Id.
None of the partnership property, nor any property of the decedent, had ever
been turned over to the executrix, but rather, remained in possession and con-
trol of the decedent's surviving partner. Id.
49. Id. Ms. McColgan's attorney had advised her that under her circum-
stances, a return was not required by law. Id.
50. Id. at 959-60. The penalty required taxpayer to pay 25% of the total
tax. Id. The Government also determined a deficiency in the tax in the amount
of $3,222.36. Id.
51. Id. at 960. Ms. McColgan contended:
(1) that the partnership assets formed no part of the decedent's
estate;
(2) that respondent had erred in determining the value of the partner-
ship interest; and
(3) that the penalty imposed by the respondent because of her failure
to file an estate tax return within the time required by law was unau-
thorized and erroneous.
Id.
52. Id. The court found that since the time to share in the partnership as-
sets passed to the estate after the death of decedent, the assets were taxable. Id.
The court also noted that petitioner introduced no satisfactory evidence regard-
ing the value of the partnership interest, and that it would affirm the determina-
tion of the respondent. Id.
53. Id. at 961.
54. Id. at 960.
55. Id. at 960-61.
56. Id. at 961.
19861 535
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the United States Tax Court in Estate of Collino,57 and again in Es-
tate of Christ v. Commissioner.58
In Collino, the delinquency penalty was abated upon a show-
ing that the inexperienced administratrix relied upon counsel's
advice that an estate tax return need not be filed.59 The court was
persuaded that the administratix's efforts in retaining a reputable
attorney and consulting with the decedent's family attorney, to-
gether with counsel's bona fide belief that the gross estate was
below the filing requirement amount, 60 constituted reasonable
cause. Similarly, reasonable cause for a delinquent return was
found in Christ because the executor showed that he always had
his lawyer prepare his tax returns and that he relied on his law-
yer's advice that no estate tax return was due. 61 The court cited
three other cases, albeit not estate tax related, as authority for its
holding that "attorney reliance" is reasonable cause for late filing
if the advice is that no return is due.62 Of course, this view was
not without its limits.
6 3
57. 25 T.C. 1026 (1956).
58. 54 T.C. 493 (1970).
59. Collino, 25 T.C. at 1036. The court observed that "[h]er lack of experi-
ence made her less than competent to serve as administratrix." Id.
60. Id. At the time of Collino's death, the Code required a return to be filed
if the decedent's gross estate exceeded $60,000. See I.R.C. § 6018 (1954) (cur-
rent version at I.R.C. § 6018(a)(1), (3) (1985)).
61. Christ, 54 T.C. at 553-54. Petitioner alleged that he had always relied
on his attorney's advice as to what tax returns needed to be filed and as to when
they should be filed. Id. at 553. Petitioner alleged that his attorney advised him
that no estate tax return need be filed because decedent's property came within
the exemption in then I.R.C. § 2032 for gross estates of less than $60,000. Id.
(citing I.R.C. § 2032 (1970)). The court was convinced that petitioner's attorney
acted in good faith and that petitioner's reliance was reasonable and justified.
Id. at 554.
62. 54 T.C. at 554 (citing Portable Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.
571 (1955) (petitioner's reliance on advice from attorney, admitted to practice
before tax court, that petitioner was not personal holding company was reason-
able cause for failure to file a personal holding company return); Twinam v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C. 83 (1954) (petitioner's reliance on attorney's advice that
payments received from former husband were not includible into income was
reasonable cause for failure to file income tax return); Patino v. Commissioner,
13 T.C. 816 (1949) (petitioner failed to file income tax return in reliance on
attorney's advice that she was nonresident alien and although tax court found
that taxpayer was a resident alien, it held that her reliance on counsel was rea-
sonable cause for failure to file return)).
63. See, e.g., Estate of Plotkin v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1011
(1972). In Plotkin, the executrix, an attorney and wife of the decedent, claimed
that she relied on the advice of another attorney that there would be no tax due
and therefore no need to file a timely return. Id. at 1013. The court noted that
although there would be no penalty if there were no tax liability, this did not
justify disregard of the filing deadline. Thus the penalty imposed on the delin-
quent return upon which a tax was ultimately due was not abated. Id. at 1014.
536 [Vol. 31: p. 525
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The more difficult case for executors arose when there was
no question concerning whether a return was due, but the delin-
quency was the result of errors of counsel. In many of the in-
stances where executors prevailed under the "attorney reliance"
theory the courts used non-estate tax cases as the basis for the
favorable decisions. The two most noteworthy are Hatfried, Inc. v.
Commissioner64 and Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner.65
These oft-cited cases help form the bedrock for proponents of the
"attorney reliance" theory.
In Hatfried, plaintiff taxpayer was a corporation which neither
filed a return nor paid tax as a personal holding company.66 All
of the company's tax returns were prepared and filed by an ac-
countant, who, despite being apprised of all the facts and circum-
stances concerning the taxpayer's activities, never indicated that a
personal holding company return was due.67  Consequently,
plaintiff never filed such a tax return.68  When the Government
determined that a personal holding company tax was due, it si-
multaneously imposed the then mandatory twenty-five percent
addition to the tax for the taxpayer's failure to file a timely re-
turn.69 The circuit court concluded that the tax was properly as-
sessed, but reversed the tax court's determination that the penalty
was proper.70 After stating that it is generally the tax court's duty
to evaluate the facts for the purpose of determining whether "rea-
64. 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947).
65. 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950).
66. Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 77, 78 (1946).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 162 F.2d at 629. The penalty in Hatied was assessed pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 291 (1947). 162 F.2d at 635. The modern version of that statute is substan-
tially the same as its predecessor. See I.R.C. § 6651 (1985). Thus, the case law
under the earlier statute is applicable in interpreting the current Code section.
For example, the Supreme Court in Boyle cited Hatfried in interpreting the
"wilfull neglect" standard encompassed in § 6651. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 690.
See also Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing
Hatfried to interpret "reasonable cause" requirement of § 6651).
For a discussion of relevant aspects of Boyle, see supra notes 5-6 & infra notes
285-308 and accompanying text. For a discussion of relevant aspects of
Rohrabaugh, see infra notes 221-47. For the relevant text of § 6651, see supra
note 7.
70. 162 F.2d at 635. The court noted that "the taxpayer here, in fact and in
law, exercised such ordinary business care and prudence as to bring him within
the rule that 'reasonable cause' means nothing more than the exercise of ordi-
nary business care and prudence and that there was no 'willful neglect.' " Id.
On this basis, the court concluded that the tax court's 25% delinquency penalty
was inappropriate. Id.
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sonable cause" is present, 71 the circuit court noted that it was not
precluded from making its own factual review if the tax court's
review was "without 'any substantial basis.' -72 Given the record
before it, the court deemed it appropriate to make its own deter-
mination of "reasonable cause."
At the outset the Hatfried court set down two controlling prin-
ciples. First, " '[r]easonable cause means nothing more than the ex-
ercise of ordinary business care and prudence' ";73 and second,
tax penalties were not intended to attach to accidental as opposed
to intentional conduct.74 Moreover, the court pointed out that
1) merely failing to file a return does not in itself prevent a finding
of "reasonable cause,"' 75 and 2) when dealing with penalty stat-
utes, questions of doubt must be decided in favor of the accused
delinquent. 76 With these ground rules in mind the court pro-
ceeded to review the record.
The court in Hatfried noted that the taxpayer made a full dis-
closure to the accountant who in turn reported the information to
the Government. 77 These facts were sufficient to distinguish the
71. Id. at 631 (citing Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219 (1944);
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943)). The court went on to state:
Whether, in a given situation, the elements which constitute "reason-
able cause" or "willful neglect" are present is a question of fact; what
elements must be present to constitute "reasonable cause" or "willful
neglect" is a question of law. It is unclear that in making its determina-
tion as to whether on the facts there was "reasonable cause," the Tax
Court must apply the legal standard or measure contained in that term.
Id. at 635 (emphasis in original).
72. 162 F.2d at 631, 635 & n.3 (quoting Commissioner v. Scottish Ameri-
can Inv. Co., 323 U.S. 119, 124 (1944)). The court noted that: " 'If a substantial
basis is lacking [for the tax court's finding and conclusion] the appellate court
may indulge in making its own inferences and conclusions or it may remand the
case to the Tax Court for further appropriate proceedings ...... Id. at 635 n.3.
73. Id. at 632 & n.1 (citing Southeastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 153
F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1946); Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 843 (3d
Cir. 1941)) (emphasis supplied by Hatfried court).
74. 162 F.2d at 632 & n.2 (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389,
394 (1933)). The court explained that this principle was evidenced by the lan-
guage of then I.R.C. § 291: "and not due to willful neglect." Id. at 632 (citing
I.R.C. § 291 (1936)).
75. See 162 F.2d at 632. The court noted that originally Congress had made
imposition of the penalty mandatory in § 291 of the 1934 Code, but that Con-
gress amended the Code in 1936 to provide for a reasonable cause exception.
Id. (citing I.R.C. § 291 (1934), amended by I.R.C. § 291 (1936)). The court then
noted that the tax court itself had construed the amendment to mean that the
imposition of the penalty for late filing is no longer mandatory. 162 F.2d at 632
(citing Estate of Kirchner, 46 B.T.A. 578 (1941)).
76. 162 F.2d at 633 (citing CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 240, at
462).
77. Id. The court noted that the taxpayer's evidence established two things:
(1) disclosure of all the facts by the taxpayer to the accountant who prepared the
[Vol. 31: p. 525
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instant case from the tax court's controlling authority, Tarbox Cor-
poration,78 where the taxpayer had not made a complete disclo-
sure.79 The court moved on to the Government's contention that
ignorance of the law, whether on the part of the taxpayer or its
representative, does not support a case of "reasonable cause." 80
The court identified a number of earlier cases where the tax court
had explicitly held to the contrary. 8' The court went on to note
the absurdity of the Treasury Department sanctioning taxpayers'
use of lawyers and accountants to prepare tax returns on the one
hand,82 and then holding taxpayers responsible for counsel's er-
rors on the other.83 It also labeled as an "inconceivable proposi-
return, and (2) disclosure by the accountant to the Government of all those
facts. Id.
78. 6 T.C. 35 (1946).
79. Id. at 37. In Tarbox, the petitioner, in reliance on advice from an attor-
ney, did not file a personal holding company return. Id. at 35-36. The evidence
showed that the president and sole stockholder of the corporation only briefly
discussed the corporation's status under the tax laws with his attorney. Id. at 37.
The court noted that:
[T]he reasons advanced by the petitioner for its failure to file a personal
holding company return either merely reduce themselves to a plea of
ignorance of the law; or amount to reliance upon an agent to whom,
apparently, insufficient information was disclosed or who likewise was
unfamiliar with the requirements of the taxing statute. Neither is suffi-
cient excuse.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. Hatfried, 162 F.2d at 633. The court summarized the Government's ar-
gument as follows: "[where] the taxpayer relied on its accountant's advice
(given by the accountant in ignorance of the law), no case of reasonable cause is
established." Id.
81. Id. (citing Girard Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1941)
(reliance on accountant who was given all relevant information was reasonable
cause of failure to file personal holding company return); C.R. Lindback Found.
v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 652 (1945) (reliance on advice of counsel and good
faith belief that petitioner was tax-exempt charitable organization constituted
reasonable cause for failure to file income tax returns), aff'd, 150 F.2d 986 (3d
Cir. 1945); Three States Lumber Co. v. C.I.R., 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 955 (1945) (reli-
ance on advice of tax advisers was reasonable cause for failure to file excess
profits tax return), rev'd on other grounds, 158 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1946)).
82. 162 F.2d at 634.
83. See 162 F.2d at 634. The court remarked:
Previously we pointed out that the Treasury Department has long given
sanction to the practice of taxpayers in enlisting the aid of accountants
in the preparation of their tax returns. To this may be added that the
Treasury Department regularly admits accountants to practice before it
in representation of taxpayers and the Tax Court does the same.
To accord the status of "experts" on the tax laws to accountants
for representing purposes and then to hold that taxpayers who entrust
to them the task of preparing their tax returns run the risk of paying
heavy penalties should they err in the discharge of their assignment
creates an absurd situation.
Id. Additionally, tax practitioners required to enroll in order to practice before
1986] 539
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tion" the argument that the return preparer is the taxpayer's
agent and consequently the taxpayer is the principal liable for his
agent's conduct, including a delinquent filing.8 4
The Hatfried decision appeared to be something more than
just a taxpayer victory. The court seemed to set down some im-
portant operating rules for both the Government and the tax
court to follow. Of additional significance, the court held that the
presence or absence of the elements constituting "reasonable
cause" is a factual question, but that identification of these ele-
ments is a question of law. 85 Unfortunately, the court failed to
definitely identify any of those elements. It was satisfied to con-
clude from the record that the taxpayer came within the rule of
"reasonable cause," which required the exercise of ordinary busi-
ness care and prudence, and nothing more.8 6 Although it did not
so state specifically, the court seemed to suggest that a complete
disclosure to counsel is a necessary element of the "ordinary busi-
ness care and prudence" standard.87
Haywood Lumber involved a personal holding company tax
problem as well.8 8 As in Hatfried, the taxpayer corporation made
complete disclosure of all facts and records to its accountant, who
nonetheless did not have the taxpayer file the required return.89
The tax court ruled that since the taxpayer did not question the
accountant concerning what returns would be required, but
merely passively accepted advice, it had not exercised ordinary
business care and prudence.90 Consequently, the tax court deter-
the IRS, see supra note 4, must now also participate in continuing professional
education. Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public
Accountants, Enrolled Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Reve-
nue Service, 51 Fed. Reg. 2875 (1986) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). The
concept of sanctioned "experts" is thus further buttressed.
84. 162 F.2d at 635. The court stated that the exercise of ordinary business
care and prudence is evidenced where taxpayers rely on agents to whom the
Treasury Department accords recognition as "experts" and "counsel." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The court seemed to focus simply on the idea that a taxpayer's good
faith reliance on an accountant's wrong advice was not the type of situation to
which the late filing penalty applied. Id.
87. See id. at 632, 633, 635. In concluding that the taxpayer exercised ordi-
nary business care and prudence, the court repeatedly referred to the fact that
the record indicated that the taxpayer had made "a full disclosure" and that his
accountant "had been advised of the facts and circumstances." Id. at 632-35.
88. 178 F.2d at 770.
89. Id. at 771. Apparently, the accountant, although fully informed of the
taxpayer corporation's business and of the opinion that it was a personal holding
company, inadvertently failed to inform the officers of the corporation that a
personal holding company tax return was required. Id. at 770.
90. Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 735, 740
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mined that there was no "reasonable cause" and no basis for
avoiding the penalty. 91
The circuit court made short shrift of the tax court's position.
It noted that the taxpayer did all that ordinary business care and
prudence could reasonably expect. 92 Moreover, it suggested that
it would be unrealistic, if not patently unfair, to require a taxpayer
to ask specific questions for the purpose of determining for itself
whether it is required to file a certain return.93 To accomplish
such a feat a taxpayer would essentially have to understand all of
the various taxes to which it could possibly be subject. 94 If the
taxpayer had this knowledge, there would be no need to seek the
advice of an expert in the first place. Relying, inter alia, on Hat-
fried, the court held that good faith reliance on the advice of coun-
sel constitutes reasonable cause when delinquent tax returns are
filed. 95 The Haywood Lumber court went one step further and re-
jected one of its earlier decisions that held a taxpayer responsible
for the failings of his tax counsel-agent. 96 The earlier decision
was inconsistent with holding that reliance on counsel could con-
(1949). The tax court noted that there was no evidence that the taxpayer corpo-
ration investigated its tax liability as a personal holding company or consulted
anyone on this matter, either before or after corporate returns were prepared.
Id. The court suggested that "it might have been a different matter" if peti-
tioner had asked its accountant whether it was liable for the personal holding
company surtax and whether it should file any forms, and had been advised that
such filing was not required. Id.
91. Id.
92. Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771. The circuit court stated that "[w]hen
a corporate taxpayer selects a competent tax expert, supplies him with all neces-
sary information, and requests him to prepare proper tax returns, we think the
taxpayer has done all that ordinary business care and prudence can reasonably
demand." Id.
93. Id. The court stated that "to require [a taxpayer] to inquire specifically
about the personal holding company act nullifies the very purpose of consulting
an expert." Id.
94. Id. The court suggested that, under a standard requiring inquiry, tax-
payers would have to inquire specifically about the applicability of various legal
principles that might be relevant to the facts. Id.
95. Id. at 771-72 (citing Hatfried, Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628, 635
(3d Cir. 1947)).
96. See id. at 771 (citing Berlin v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 242 (1932)). In Berlin, the taxpayer, through his accountant,
requested and was granted an extension of time in which to file an income tax
return. 59 F.2d at 996. Because of illness, the taxpayer requested a second ex-
tension. Id. at 997. The second extension was granted on the condition that an
estimated return be filed with one-quarter of the estimated tax due. Id. The
accountant for the taxpayer merely filed a return showing gross income of
$50,000 and deductions equal to that amount. Id. The court held that the esti-
mated return was inadequate and therefore did not constitute a filing. Id.
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stitute "reasonable cause." Recognizing this, the Haywood Lumber
court stated:
To impute to the taxpayer the mistakes of his consultant
would be to penalize him for consulting an expert; for if
he must take the benefit of his counsel's or accountant's
advice cum onere, then he must be held to a standard of
care which is not his own and one which, in most cases,
would be far higher than one of a layman. 97
There seems to be no doubt that the court believed a principal-
agent theory is not a controlling influence when determining
whether reliance on counsel constitutes reasonable cause for de-
linquent tax return filers.
Taken together, the two cases provide the foundation for the
"attorney reliance" theory. Hatfried made clear that establishing
"reasonable cause" meant merely exercising ordinary business
care and prudence.98 Selecting an expert, whether legal counsel
or an accountant, to handle one's tax matters and relying on such
expert's advice was accepted as exhibiting ordinary business care
and prudence. 99 Additionally, the court dismissed as absurd any
attempt to employ a principal-agent argument to impute the tax
expert's negligence or ignorance 00 to the taxpayer so as to pre-
clude the latter from meeting the ordinary care and prudence
standard. Haywood Lumber reaffirmed the principles set out in Hat-
fried, emphasizing the frivolity of applying a principal-agent the-
ory to these types of "attorney reliance" cases.' 0 ' Of equal
importance in Haywood was the assertion that the taxpayer had no
duty to "quiz" the tax expert about all possible tax exposures. 102
Ordinary business care and prudence required only that the
preparer be furnished all the necessary information and re-
97. 178 F.2d at 771.
98. For a discussion of Hatfried, see supra note 66-87 and accompanying
text.
99. For a discussion of this aspect of Hatfried, see supra notes 81 & 87 and
accompanying text.
100. For a discussion of this aspect of Hatfried, see supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text. In most instances, executors advance theories of counsel's
negligence as the basis for establishing reasonable cause. Some counsel may
just be unaware of the law, it should be noted, and in this context their igno-
rance should not be distinguished from simple negligence.
101. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Haywood Lumber, see supra notes
96-97 and accompanying text. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Haifried,
see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
102. See 178 F.2d at 771. For a discussion of this aspect of Haywood Lumber,
see supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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quested to file the required return(s). A taxpayer's passivity be-
yond that point did not undermine those actions which
constituted reasonable cause.' 0 3 Although never presented ex-
plicitly as a rule, exercising care and prudence implicitly requires
honest dealing. Thus, taxpayers were required to make full dis-
closures to their preparers,10 4 and to rely in good faith on advice
received. 10 5
An additional noteworthy point remains. Both cases in-
volved situations where returns were not filed because taxpayers,
relying on counsel, had no reason to believe that the returns were
required. 0 6 To a large degree the cases can be read to say noth-
ing more than McColgan, Collino, and Christ.10 7 Could the princi-
ples enunciated in Hatfried and Haywood Lumber carry the day when
the taxpayer was aware that a return was required, but nonethe-
less failed to file it on time? An answer came rather quickly in In re
Fisk's Estate. 10 8
The facts presented by the Fisk court are sparce, but it ap-
pears that the executor of Fisk's estate retained counsel for the
purpose of preparing and filing the estate tax return. 0 9 There
was some concern expressed by the tax court as to how long
103. 178 F.2d at 771.
104. Although in Haywood Lumber the court did not hold that full disclosure
was a requisite element to find reasonable cause, it did stress that the taxpayer's
accountant was given all the information necessary for rendering the proper tax
advice. See id. at 770.
105. See id. at 771. In rejecting Berlin, the court ruled that cases holding
that reliance on counsel constitutes reasonable cause are inconsistent with the
cum onere doctrine. Id. (citing Berlin v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 996 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932)). For a discussion of Berlin, and the Haywood court's
rejection of it, see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
106. See Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771; Hatfried, 162 F.2d at 632.
107. The McColgan, Collino, and Christ courts held that since the executors in
those cases were unfamiliar with tax law and relied in good faith on attorney
advice that no returns needed to be filed, there was "reasonable cause" for the
late filing of returns which were required to be filed. See Christ, 54 T.C. at 554;
Collino, 25 T.C. at 1036; McColgan, 10 B.T.A. at 961. For a discussion of Christ,
see supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Collino, see
supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of McColgan, see
supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
108. 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953).
109. See id. at 359. The Sixth Circuit noted that the tax court made the
following findings of fact:
The evidence on this phase of the case is meager. We know that
petitioner turned the preparation and filing of the estate tax return
over to an attorney. How long before the due date that was done is not
shown. The attorney had had but a limited experience with tax matters,
but he did consult respondent's regulations before preparing and mail-
ing the return. No explanation is offered as to why mailing was put off
until the due date. The most we can say is that possibly the attorney
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before the due date of the return the taxpayer waited until hiring
counsel," l0 but the circuit court was not particularly concerned
with the issue."' In any event the return was mailed on its due
date but received by the Government one day later and a delin-
quency penalty was assessed accordingly."l 2 The court, relying
on Hatfried and Haywood Lumber throughout its brief opinion,
abated the penalty. 1 3 In so doing it approved the principle that
reliance on counsel constitutes "reasonable cause" as a matter of
law,' 14 and extended the rule to cover the late filing of tax returns
of taxpayers who seemingly were aware of the correct due date. "15
Fisk's apparently broad interpretation and application of Hat-
fried and Haywood Lumber was not universally accepted" 6 but it
assumed that if he mailed the return on the due date it would be treated
as having been timely filed.
Id. (quoting Estate of Fisk v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 77, 78-79 (1952)).
110. See id. Although the tax court did not expressly find that the taxpayer
waited too long to turn the preparation of the estate tax return over to an attor-
ney, the tenor of the court's comments suggests that the judge suspected that
the taxpayer did, indeed, wait too long to find appropriate assistance. Id. For
the language of the tax court's findings, see supra note 109.
111. See id. at 359. Although quoting the language from the tax court deci-
sion discussing the nearness in time of the due date to the date upon which the
taxpayer hired counsel, the Sixth Circuit seemed more impressed with the fact
that the return itself indicated that a considerable period of time had been spent
in its preparation. Id. at 359-60. In any case, the court never seemed to inte-
grate the tax court's finding into its decision. See id. For the language of the tax
court decision, see supra note 109.
112. Id. at 358-59.
113. Id. at 359-60 (citing Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d 769; Hatfried, 162 F.2d
628, 635)).
114. Id. at 360.
115. Id. The court stated:
[The Haywood Lumber] rule, we hold, applies to the filing of tax returns
as well as to reliance upon technical advice in complicated legal mat-
ters. We think this conclusion is in accord with the principle declared
by the Supreme Court that the penalties under the revenue laws were
designed to be imposed upon conduct "which is intentional, or know-
ing, or involuntary as distinguished from accidental."
Id. (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933)).;
116. See, e.g., Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957)
(where executor knew tax return was due, relied on attorney for timely filing,
and made no attempt to determine whether attorney was acting with diligence,
there was no reasonable cause and late filing penalty was not abated); Pfeiffer v.
United States, 315 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (executrix's reliance upon ac-
countant to file timely estate tax returns was not reasonable cause for late filing
because executrix was under obligation to ascertain her obligations and to over-
see activities of accountant). Moreover, it should be noted that in Boyle, both
Haywood Lumber and Hatfried were cited with approval, but their application was
limited to cases in which the taxpayer relied on counsel's advice as to whether or
not a return had to be filed at all. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693 (citing Haywood
Lumber, 178 F.2d 769; Haifried, 162 F.2d 628).
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was incorporated into the majority view expressed in Geisen v.
United States." 7 The Geisen court proceeded to enunciate condi-
tions drawn from prior case law, which, if met, would enable reli-
ance on counsel to constitute "reasonable cause." The
conditions were: The taxpayer must 1) be unfamiliar with tax
law;' 8 2) have made a full disclosure of all relevant facts to coun-
sel;"19 and 3) have exercised ordinary business care and pru-
dence.120 In the same paragraph in which the third condition was
listed, the court stated that selecting competent counsel, furnish-
ing him with the necessary information, and requesting that he
prepare the returns are sufficient to meet this condition.' 2 ' This
is, of course, somewhat confusing, because satisfying the last con-
dition in and of itself appears to constitute "reasonable cause." It
seems that a more appropriate approach would have been to con-
sider reliance on counsel as constituting reasonable cause if the
first and second conditions are met, i.e., if there is complete dis-
closure of all the relevant facts by a taxpayer unfamiliar with the
laws. But even if the Geisen court did not articulate its test in the
most eloquent manner, it nonetheless synthesized the then ma-
jority viewpoint' 22 into a workable model.
The Geisen test was refined in United States v. Gray. 123 In Gray,
the executrix hired an experienced attorney to handle the estate,
including the filing of any necessary tax returns. 124 The executrix
supplied counsel with all requested materials, but because of the
attorney's mistaken belief as to its due date, the estate tax return
was filed late.' 25 A delinquency penalty was assessed. The plain-
117. 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
118. Id. at 35 (citing Estate of Moyer v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 617 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); Orient Inv. & Finance Co. v. Com-
missioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948)).
119. Id. at 36 (citing Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d 769; Hatfried, 162 F.2d 628).
120. Id. (citing Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771).
121. Id. (citations omitted).
122. This view can be found in the line of cases that includes In re Fisk's
Estate, 203 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1953); Haywood Lumber & Mining Co. v. Com-
missioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950); Orient Inv. & Finance Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948). The Geisen court noted that the Eleventh
Circuit had adopted the majority rule in Commissioner v. American Ass'n of
Eng'rs Employment Co., 204 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1953). 369 F. Supp. at 36.
123. 453 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
124. Id. at 1358. The court noted that the attorney had been recommended
to the executrix because the attorney had been involved in probate and estate
administration for more than twenty years. Id.
125. Id. Although the attorney informed the executrix that an estate tax
return had to be filed, he did not tell her when it was due. Id. The executrix did
not contact anybody else regarding the estate, but relied on the attorney to han-
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tiff argued that reliance on counsel by a taxpayer unfamliar with
the law who makes full disclosure to the preparer constitutes
"reasonable cause" as a matter of law.' 26 The Government coun-
tered that such reliance could only be considered reasonable with
respect to whether or not a return had to be filed, and not to the
actual physical filing of the return. 2 7 The court was able to avoid
addressing the validity of such a distinction because the facts of
the major authority for the Government's proposition were
clearly distinguishable from the facts under review. 128 The court
went on to hold that reliance on counsel constitutes reasonable
cause so long as the taxpayer has no actual knowledge, from
whatever source, of the due date of the return. 29 Additionally,
the "passivity" position set forth in Haywood Lumber was reaf-
firmed, as the court stated there was no duty on a taxpayer to
either monitor counsel's activities or research the tax law to ascer-
tain a filing deadline if there is no knowledge of counsel's mishan-
dling of tax matters.13 0 Although Gray is clearly a pro-taxpayer
decision, it appeared to add an important caveat to those seeking
die everything. Id. The return was due some nine months after the decedent's
death, but the attorney thought he had 15 months in which to get it filed. Id.
The return was actually filed almost 15 months to the day from decedent's
death. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Government attempted to limit reliance on counsel as reason-
able cause to those cases in which the taxpayer relied on the advice of counsel
that no return was due. Id. (citing United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir.
1977)). In Kroll, the executor retained an experienced attorney to handle the
administration and probate of his mother-in-law's estate. 547 F.2d at 394-95.
The attorney did not file the tax estate return within the time provided by law.
Id. at 395. The estate paid the assessed penalties and brought a refund suit. Id.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's decision in favor of the taxpayer,
noting that the taxpayer knew that the return had not been timely filed, yet took
no affirmative steps to remedy the situation. Id. at 396-97. The court concluded
that, although the taxpayer was not an expert and had made full disclosure of
the facts necessary for the attorney to compute the estate's tax, he did not need
to rely on the attorney to file the return because he knew that it was overdue. Id.
at 395.
128. See 453 F. Supp. at 1358. The Gray court relied heavily on the fact
that the taxpayer did not know the return's due date nor that the return became
overdue. Id. at 1361.
129. Id. The court cautioned, however, that "[i]f the taxpayer acquires
knowledge of the due date from any source, reliance on an attorney after that
date cannot amount to "reasonable cause." Id.
130. Id. at 1360-61. The court noted that "[u]nless the taxpayer knows
when the return is due, he would have to delve into the Tax Code and its regula-
tions to find out. It is this task that the taxpayer is paying the lawyer to per-
form." Id. at 1361. See HaywoodLumber, 178 F.2d at 771. For a discussion of the
Haywood Lumber court's analysis of the passivity position, see supra notes 10 1-03
and accompanying text.
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protection under the attorney reliance theory, namely, the tax-
payer must have no actual knowledge of the due date of the re-
turn. On the other hand, it also re-established that taxpayers
need not make continued inquiry of counsel to be considered as
exercising ordinary business care and prudence.
A review of other cases where reliance on counsel constituted
"reasonable cause" for delinquent filing' 3 ' would offer nothing of
significance to the immediate point to be made. The rules set out
in Hatfried and Haywood Lumber, synthesized in Geisen and refined
by Gray, are for the most part the same ones used by the courts
reaching pro-taxpayer results. For reliance on an attorney to con-
stitute "reasonable cause" the taxpayer must lack a general un-
derstanding of tax matters and, without actual knowledge of the
due date of the return, hire counsel to file the return and make
full disclosure to assist in that effort. These were the legal ele-
ments that would, if factually proven, permit a penalty to be
abated. The process required a case-by-case deliberation,
stressing the absence of a per se rule as to whether or not reliance
on counsel constituted "reasonable cause."
B. The Other Side
Notwithstanding some success, the "attorney reliance" the-
ory was not warmly embraced by all courts. Even if all of the Gei-
sen conditions were met, victory was not assured.' 3 2 Moreover,
putting aside the often stated belief that "reasonable cause" is
primarily a question of fact to be determined on an individual
case-by-case basis, other criteria for establishing the presence or
absence of "reasonable cause" were formulated and given prior-
ity over the Geisen test. The most notable of these involved the
recognition of a nondelegable duty on the executor to file the es-
tate tax return. This theory was impressively presented in Fer-
rando v. United States.133
131. Other cases cited for this proposition include: Orient Inv. & Finance
Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Girard Inv. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 122 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1941); Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
132. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1983);
Millette & Assocs. v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121, 124-25 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979); Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner,
365 F.2d 846, 854 (5th Cir. 1966); Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582, 589
(9th Cir. 1957). In all of the above cases the courts held that a taxpayer has a
nondelegable duty to file a tax return on time and that reliance on counsel will
not constitute reasonable cause for the taxpayer's tardy filing.
133. 245 F.2d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 1957).
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In Ferrando, the decedent's surviving spouse and son, as co-
executors, employed an attorney to handle, inter alia, the filing of
the estate tax return. The return was filed late.' 34 It is clear even
from the brief presentation of the facts that there were questiona-
ble activities surrounding the filing of the estate tax return, 3 5 and
ultimately a criminal proceeding ensued.' 3 6 In any event the
court accepted the trial court findings that the taxpayers 1) knew a
return was due; 2) made no attempt to ascertain whether the at-
torney was in the process of filing or had filed the return; 3) were
wilfully neglectful in not questioning the attorney's diligence; and
4) did not have "reasonable cause" for the delinquent filing.13 7
The court offered the following general rule:
The filing of a tax return when due is a personal, nondelega-
ble duty of the taxpayer; as a general proposition, it is no
valid excuse for him to say that the matter was put in
charge of an employee or accountant or attorney, no
matter how trustworthy that person may be. 138
The only authority cited by the court for this proposition was
American Law Reports.139 Nonetheless, the court apparently
adopted it as the controlling rule for its decision because it con-
tinued its discussion in a conclusive fashion: "Accordingly, we
hold that the appellants have failed to discharge their burden of
establishing that the failure to file a return was due to reasonable
cause . "140
Although not stated, it is evident that the executors were ar-
134. Id. at 584.
135. See id. Notably the check tendered for payment of the tax bore a date
earlier than the due date of the return, even though the executor's checkbook
showed a substantially later date for the check. Id.
136. See Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1954). Mr. Cos-
grove, the attorney for the estate of Ferrando, was charged and convicted of
defrauding the United States by filing fraudulent estate tax returns. Id. His
conviction, however, was reversed on appeal. Id.
137. 245 F.2d at 587. The Ninth Circuit found the testimony presented
substantial evidence to support those findings of fact. Id. at 588. In this regard
the court observed that it is required to give the same weight to tax court deci-
sions as is given to district court decisions. Id. (citing United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949); Pacific Homes v. United States, 230 F.2d 755, 759
(9th Cir. 1956); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
138. Id. at 589 (quoting Annot., 3 A.L.R. 2d 617, 619 (1949) (emphasis
added)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 589. The court concluded that:
[T]here is no reason for this court to disturb the findings of the District
Judge, to the effect that the failure of the four appellants to file proper
estate tax returns was not due to reasonable cause; and that the defec-
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guing a "reliance on counsel" theory to avoid imposition of the
penalty. This can be gleaned from the discussion of the execu-
tors' backgrounds, business experiences, and other dealings with
the lawyer.' 41 But these items would appear to have no bearing
on the final decision since the nondelegability of the duty to file a
return should apply to inexperienced as well as knowledgeable
taxpayers equally. It is unfortunate that what was to become an
oft-cited rule arose in a case containing such unsavory facts. One
can only wonder if the court would have enunciated such a harsh,
strict rule if the activities of the taxpayers and counsel in Ferrando
had not bordered on fraud. Speculation of this type, however,
may have been put to rest by Pfeiffer v. United States, 1 42 a case hav-
ing much greater taxpayer sympathy appeal but the same costly
result.
In Pfeiffer, the elderly widow of the decedent served as execu-
trix.' 43 She entrusted the administration of the estate to her fam-
ily attorney, who had also prepared the decedent's will. 14 4 The
estate tax return was filed late, apparently because a deductible
claim against the estate was in doubt. 1 45 This unknown amount
tive return filed before the due date by the appellants.., did not pro-
tect them from the assignment of the twenty-five percent penalty.
Id. (emphasis in original).
141. See id. at 585-86. The court noted in its statement of the facts that Mr.
Cosgrove had represented the decedent in other legal matters, and had drawn
his will. Id. at 584. The defendant co-executors expressed to the court dece-
dent's inexperience in business matters and limited education. Id. at 585. From
defendants' statement of the case, the court discerned that defendants' argu-
ment was premised on the attorney reliance theory. Id. at 586.
142. 315 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
143. Id. at 393. Although the age of the executrix, Mrs. Pfeiffer, is not dis-
closed, the facts do indicate that she attended business college around 1910,
some fifty plus years before becoming executrix. Id. at 395.
144. Id. The attorney then hired a certified public accountant to prepare
and file the tax return. Id.
145. Id. at 395 & n.3. The court noted that the accountant apparently felt
that he could not accurately compute the estate tax until the exact amount of a
claim against the Pfeiffer estate was determined. Id. The claim had been filed
against the estate by the California State Department of Mental Hygiene for the
future support of Thelma Pfeiffer, the daughter of the decedent by a prior mar-
riage. Id. at 393 & n. 1. Thelma had been committed to the Napa State Hospital
as a mentally ill person in 1935 and had been a patient there ever since. Id. at
393.
The Department of Mental Hygiene made its claim for future support of
Thelma pursuant to § 205 of the California Civil Code. See CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 205 (West 1976).
This statute provides:
If a parent chargeable with the support of a child dies, leaving it
chargeable to the county, or leaving it confined in a state institution to
be cared for in whole or in part at the expense of the State, and such
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prevented the preparer from computing the estate tax due. 146
The taxpayer contended that in light of her lack of business and
tax experience her total reliance on competent counsel to take
care of the affairs of the estate manifested the exercise of ordinary
business care and prudence and constituted "reasonable
cause."
14 7
The court noted that, upon assuming the position of execu-
trix, decedent's widow became obligated to do more than make a
complete delegation of her duties. 48 She was obligated to mini-
mally oversee the administration of the estate and, at the least, to
find out what her duties were.149 The court thus concluded that
she should have known both that an estate tax return was re-
quired and when it was due.' 50 The court also noted that the ex-
ecutrix signed a form stating that a return was due.' 5' However,
the latter fact did not seem to be of much importance. The court,
citing Ferrando, went on to recite a flat rule that "reliance on an
attorney or accountant to file an estate tax return [does] not con-
parent leaves an estate sufficient for its support, the supervisors of the
county or the director of the state department having jurisdiction over
the institution involved, as the case may be, may claim provision for its
support from the parent's estate by a civil action, and for this purpose
may have the same remedies as any creditors against the estate, and
against the heirs, devisees, and next of kin of the parent.
Id.
146. 315 F. Supp. at 395. The claim was eventually satisfied by payment of
$12,148.42 from the Pfeiffer estate to the guardian of the person and the estate
of Thelma for her future support. Id. at 393.
147. Id. at 395-96.
148. Id. at 396. The court also noted that the position as executrix was not
an honorary one, as decedent's widow received a commission for fulfilling her
obligations. Id.
149. Id. (citing Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967),
aff'dper curiam, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969)). For a discussion of Duttenhofer, see
infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
150. 315 F. Supp. at 396.
151. Id. Plaintiff had signed a Tax Form 704, entitled "Estate Tax Prelimi-
nary Notice." Id. The Internal Revenue Code requires every executor to notify
the IRS that he has qualified to be the executor of the estate in such manner and
time as the regulations require. See I.R.C. § 6036 (1985). A treasury regulation
required that every citizen of the United States whose gross estate at the time of
death exceeded $60,000 to file a preliminary notice on Form 704 within two
months of death. Treas. Reg. § 20.6036-1 (a). Subsection (b) of that regulation
required the duly qualified executor to file the notice. Id. § 20.6036-1 (b). Form
704 contained a notice informing the executor that a return was due within 15
months from the date of death of the decedent, and that failure to file timely
would result in the imposition of a penalty. However, Treas. Reg. § 20.6036-1
was amended by T.D. 7238, 37 Fed. Reg. 28,721 (1972), so that Form 704 was
required only for estates of decedents dying before January 1, 1971. See Treas.
Reg. § 20.6036-1 (1985).
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stitute reasonable cause for late filing .... ,,152 This language
leaves little doubt that Ferrando was interpreted as having estab-
lished a per se rule against reliance on counsel constituting "rea-
sonable cause" for delinquent estate tax return filings.
In Estate of Frank Duttenhofer,' 53 the tax court also made quite
clear its approval of the Ferrando reasoning. In Duttenhofer, the de-
cedent named two co-executors in his will, only one of whom had
any degree of business experience. The experienced individual
knew an estate tax return would be due, although he did not know
when.' 54 The executors hired an attorney (requested by the dece-
dent in his will) who in turn had them sign an "Estate Tax Prelim-
inary Notice."' 155 The notice contained a sentence in bold type
stating how many months from death the return would be due.' 56
The record is clear that the attorney controlled the entire admin-
istration of the estate. 157 Unfortunately, the estate tax return was
filed more than five months late.' 58 A request for an extension
was made, but was denied because it was made and received after
the due date of the return. 59 It was not until after the extension
152. 315 F. Supp. at 396 (citing Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 589). For a detailed
discussion of Ferrando, see supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
153. 49 T.C. 200 (1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969).
154. 49 T.C. at 201-02. One of the executors, William, was the 77-year-old
brother of the decedent and a factory worker with only four years of formal edu-
cation. Id. at 201. The other executor, Albert, was 38 years of age, a high school
graduate, and the president of the company which decedent had controlled, and
at which William had worked for over 20 years. Id. at 201-02. While neither had
previously been an executor or administrator of an estate, Albert had some mini-
mal knowledge of his obligations. Id.
155. Id. at 202. The attorney, who had been decedent's legal consultant for
10 years, drafted this Form 704 Tax Notice and had each of the executors sign it.
Id. For a discussion of Form 704, see supra note 151.
156. 49 T.C. at 202. The court stated that within one and one half inches
of the executors' signatures on the document, the following statement appeared:
NOTICE-Failure to file a required return on Form 706 within 15
months from the date of death may render executors, administrators
and persons in actual or constructive possession of the decedent's
property liable for penalties.
Id.
157. Id. at 202-03. The court noted that the attorney made the policy deci-
sions and performed all other work for the estate including handling the matters
pertaining to estate taxes and income taxes. Id. at 203. The court stated that the
attorney also represented the estate in litigation, which included disposition of
the proceeds from a life insurance policy, State of Ohio taxes on certain mort-
gages, and a petition filed by the decedent's surviving spouse. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The estate tax return was due on May 22, 1964, and the request for
an extension of time for filing was not made until September 16, 1964. Id. A
relevant treasury regulation provides that any taxpayer desiring an extension for
filing a return must request the extension on or before the due date of the re-
turn. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-1(b) (1960).
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request that the executors became aware of the due date of the
return and of the fact that it was late. In attempting to have the
penalty abated the taxpayers claimed that their reliance on coun-
sel constituted "reasonable cause."160
In holding against the taxpayers, the court made clear that,
unlike the petitioners, ordinary and prudent businessmen would
not abdicate their responsibilities and blindly acquiesce to all of
the directions of counsel.' 6 ' Particularly disconcerting was the
executors' failure to inquire into the duties put upon them by dint
of their position 162 and the knowledge, presumed if not actual,
that a return was due. Citing Ferrando, the court emphasized that
executors must accept the responsibility to some degree of moni-
toring their attorneys' actions and cannot be considered prudent
where they fail to discover the filing requirements of a return
known to be due. 163 The court seemingly transformed these re-
sponsibilities into a standard for determining "ordinary business
care and prudence." Since petitioners failed to meet the stan-
dard, their delinquency was without "reasonable cause."' 164
After deciding that the taxpayers had not established their
case, the court went on to discuss petitioners' contention that reli-
ance on counsel is reasonable cause as a matter of law. The cases
cited for support of that contention were distinguished on the
ground that the taxpayers there had no knowledge that returns
were required. 165 In the instant case the issue was "when" and
not "whether" to file. The distinction appears crucial to the anal-
ysis, but its importance was quickly diminished by the court's sub-
sequent comment, which in effect posited that reliance on counsel
160. 49 T.C. at 204.
161. Id.
162. Id. Although the court does not\enumerate a list of duties imposed
upon an executor, it does make clear that ascertaining the due date is one of
those duties. Id.
163. Id. at 205 (citing Ferrando, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11,615 (N.D.
Cal. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1957)). For a discussion of Ferrando, see
supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
164. 49 T.C. at 206-07.
165. Id. at 205. The petitioners relied on the following cases: Haywood
Lumber & Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1950); Orient
Inv. & Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hatfried,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947); Brooklyn & Richmond Ferry
Co., 9 T.C. 865 (1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
968 (1949); Safety Tube Corp. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 757 (1947), aff'd, 168
F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1948). The Duttenhofer court noted that in each of these cases
the taxpayers were without knowledge that the tax returns were required. 49
T.C. at 205. Instead, the taxpayer relied on counsel's advice that no return was
required to be filed. Id.
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will not constitute "reasonable cause" if the taxpayer "should
know a return is required."' 166 Although further clarification of
the use of "should" is not provided, based upon the court's ear-
lier discussion of executors' minimal responsibilities, it seems that
executors "should" always ascertain if a return is required. 167
Thus, it can be argued that Duttenhofer sets forth a per se rule that
reliance on counsel is not "reasonable cause" for delinquent fil-
ings of estate tax returns.
Although not openly taken to this extreme, Duttenhofer illus-
trates the strict tenor of the tax court's view on the issue. Its
opinion in the Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner,'68 although relat-
ing to an executor's duty to file an income tax rather than an es-
tate tax return, is illustrative. In Lammerts, the executor retained
the decedent's accountant to prepare the decedent's personal tax
returns and hired an attorney to file the estate tax return. 169 The
executor was unaware that the estate was also required to file an
income tax return and, despite having both an attorney and ac-
countant on hand, was not advised of this fact. 170 The court held
that ignorance of the filing requirement did not constitute reason-
able cause even though the executor seemingly relied on advisors
166. 49 T.C. at 205. The court stated:
It is our opinion that where a taxpayer should know a tax return is
required (and here Albert did know that a tax return was required), but
delegates the responsibility of preparing and filing the return to a third
person, the delegate's subsequent failure in this appointed task does
not alone constitute reasonable cause for failure to file on time under
section 6651.
Id. (citing Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 854 (5th Cir.
1966); Southeastern Finance Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.
1946); Estate of Mayer, 43 T.C. 403 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 351 F.2d 617 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966)).
167. 49 T.C. at 205. For a discussion of the executors' minimal responsibil-
ities, see supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
168. 54 T.C. 420 (1970), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 456 F.2d 681 (2d
Cir. 1972).
169. 54 T.C. at 428. No specific instructions were given to the accountant
by the executor. Id. In fact, the accountant never received access to some of the
records maintained by the attorney hired to file the estate tax returns. Id. The
court thus held that any belief by the executor, under these circumstances, that
the accountant would handle the preparation of all necessary tax returns of the
estate, "cannot be regarded as reasonable." Id. at 446.
170. Id. at 429. The executor argued that he had never acted in the capac-
ity of an executor prior to this instance and therefore had no knowledge of what
tax returns had to be filed. Id. The accountant retained to prepare the dece-
dent's personal tax returns eventually discovered that the fiduciary income tax
return had not been filed and immediately informed the executor of his duty to
file such a return. Id. The return was then prepared by the accountant, but it
was not filed until seven months after the statutory filing deadline. Id.
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to apprise him of the necessity of filing the return. 71 The execu-
tor was held to have an affirmative duty to ascertain his responsi-
bilities of office and merely thinking he had executed what he
believed to be his duties was insufficient. 172 The court found that
the executor never inquired into what his duties were. The fail-
ure to determine one's duties was held to be neither ordinary
"nor prudent" conduct and precluded a finding of "reasonable
cause."' 173 The court, however, did note that filing an estate in-
come tax return is neither complicated nor unusual, and left room
for limiting its holding to matters of similar ilk.1 74 Unfortunately,
the filing of an estate tax return would probably be considered
equally, if not more, basic than the estate income tax return were
the issue ever brought before the court.
On appeal,' 75 the penalty issue was given short shrift. The
tax court decision was affirmed because "executors [are] charged
with the responsibility of making inquiry in the exercise of 'ordi-
nary business care and prudence.' "176 "Passivity," the court con-
cluded, cannot be the basis of reasonable cause. 177 Of particular
interest was the distinction drawn between Haywood Lumber and
171. Id. at 446. The court acknowledged that the executor's lack of knowl-
edge as to his obligations as executor was due to his inexperience. Id. However,
the court held that inasmuch as the executor was without knowledge as to his
duties, he had an affirmative duty to seek advice from either his accountant or
attorney as to what federal tax returns were required. Id.
172. Id. at 446. The court rejected the executor's argument that he reason-
ably relied upon his accountant and attorney for preparation of all necessary tax
returns. Id. As to the accountant, the executor never discussed estate matters
with him and in fact the books and records at the estate were maintained by the
attorney. Id. Additionally, the accountant testified that the majority of his work
for the decedent's family dealt with repeat returns and the accountant stated that
he did not anticipate that his office would be required to prepare the fiduciary
income tax return. Id. With respect to the executor's attempt to demonstrate
reliance upon his attorney, the court stated that the executor had an affirmative
duty to ask the attorney what returns were necessary. Id. While the court recog-
nized that this oversight by the executor was probably in good faith, the court
found no basis for a holding that the executor's inadvertance was reasonable.
Id. at 447.
173. Id. at 446. The court said that the executor "had a positive duty to
ascertain the nature of his responsibilities as such. The fact that he, in good
faith, believed that he had done all that was required of him when the estate tax
return was filed is not an excusable circumstance." Id. (citing Fides v. Commis-
sioner, 137 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 797 (1943)).
174. 54 T.C. at 446 (citing R.A. Bryan, 32 T.C. 104, 133 (1959) (reliance by
taxpayer upon professional advice may constitute reasonable cause where mat-
ter involved is "complicated and unusual, justifying such reliance")).
175. See 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1972).
176. Id. at 683 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 301-6651-1(a)(3) (1985)).
177. Id.
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Lammerts.i 78 The court felt that the taxpayer's direction to coun-
sel in the former case that all necessary returns be filed coupled
with his supplying of relevant information was quite different
from the passivity on the part of Lammerts' executor. 179 It is sug-
gested that this distinction is indeed fuzzy. How can one seri-
ously contend that there is a difference between a taxpayer who
directs his counselor to file all necessary returns and one who re-
tains counsel to handle all aspects of administering the estate?
Unless the executor explicitly expresses a desire not to have the
return filed or willfully withholds necessary information, is he not,
investing counsel with full authority to handle all matters that the
executor is directing, implicitly directing that all necessary tasks,
including filing returns, be performed? It seems too much em-
phasis may be placed on a simple choice of words. Specifically, if
the executor directs that all tax returns be filed, a late filing could
be spared penalty under Haywood Lumber;180 but if the executor
obtains counsel for handling all aspects of the estate and fails to
identify the particular act of filing a return he may be considered
passive and not entitled to relief. The disposition of these cases
ought not to rest on such questionable distinctions.
Notwithstanding its objectionable nature, this line of reason-
ing has taken hold in the other circuits. In Millette &Associates, Inc.
v. Commissioner,18 1 for example, the Fifth Circuit stated that "it is
well established that reliance on tax advisors is not reasonable
cause for failure to file a return on time; the responsibility for
assuring a timely filing is the taxpayer's." 82 By imposing upon
the taxpayer the onus of "assuring" that the return is filed, the
178. For a detailed discussion Haywood Lumber, see supra notes 88-108 and
accompanying text.
179. 456 F.2d at 683 (citing Haywood Lumber v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d
769 (2d Cir. 1950)). In Haywood Lumber, a corporate officer gave directions to
counsel that all necessary information be supplied to the accountant and that all
necessary tax returns be filed. 178 F.2d 771. The Haywood Lumber court empha-
sized that the executor had not "awaited passively for such tax advice." Id.
Rather, the court noted, "he affirmatively requested the preparation by his con-
sultant of proper returns." Id.
180. 178 F.2d at 771. The court in Haywood Lumber held that if an executor
supplies counsel with "all necessary information, and requests him to prepare proper
tax returns [he] has done all that ordinary business care and prudence can reason-
ably demand." Id. (emphasis added).
181. 594 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 899 (1979).
182. 594 F.2d at 125 (citing Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d
846, 854 (5th Cir. 1966)). The court in Millette emphasized that the corpora-
tion's president in that case did not "take steps to ensure that the return was
filed." Id. at 125. In fact, the president testified that he had "no recollection of
receiving the return from the preparer or of signing and filing it." Id. at 123.
1986]
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court seems to be accepting the view that passivity after turning
the matter over to counsel is insufficient activity to establish "rea-
sonable cause." Although in Millette a consolidated corporate tax
return was in issue, it seems fair to conclude that the same stan-
dard would be applicable to executors and their obligation to file
estate tax returns.183
A similar position was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Estate
of Lillehei.'8 4 There the court affirmed the tax court's holding that
an executor's duties include both ascertaining the due date of the
estate tax return and seeing that the attorney files it on time.' 8 5
The tax court's opinion was, in effect, incorporated into the deci-
sion, further evidencing acceptance of the "personal, nondelega-
ble duty" theory.' 86 The Lillehei holding that the duty to file an
estate tax return is a personal, nondelegable duty has been cited
as controlling in the Eighth Circuit. 187
183. 594 F.2d at 123. In Millette, the principal corporation (Millette) and its
subsidiary had never filed a consolidated return for any year prior to 1972. Id.
Therefore, regulations required that Millette's 1972 consolidated corporate tax
return be filed not later than March 15, 1975. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 6072(b)
(1972)). Millette, however, did not file its return until May 9, 1975. 594 F.2d at
123. The court held Millette liable for a 25% addition to its tax, the maximum
addition allowable. Id. at 121.
The key determination is not the type of the tax return which must be filed,
but whether the taxpayer was aware of the requirement to file. See United States
v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393, 396 (7th Cir. 1977). In Kroll, the court distinguished
cases in which no penalty was imposed because there was good faith reliance on
counsel as to whether a return had to be filed. Id. The court stated that these
cases "do not sanction an abdication of responsibility for the timey filing of a
return admittedly due." Id. See also Boyle v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985)
(obligation on executor to ascertain and meet statutory deadline, and failure to
meet deadline is not excused by taxpayer's reliance on agent); Fleming v. United
States, 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981) (executor who knew estate tax return had
to be filed and knew due date could not rely on attorney to perform executor's
duties).
184. 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1981).
185. Id. at 66 (citing Estate of Lillehei, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,464 (1979)).
186. 638 F.2d at 66. After reviewing the facts, the court stated: "We affirm
the judgment of the tax court on the basis of that court's opinion." Id. It should
be noted that the court mentioned that the executor here had previously served
as executor of another estate, but it is not clear whether the court considered
this fact to be particularly significant. Id. The opinion speaks in terms of the
personal and nondelegable duty of executors generally; thus the relative experi-
ence of the executor in Lillehei to the duties of his title apparently was not dispos-
itive. Id.
187. See Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 955 (1985) (executrix's reliance on incorrect advice from coun-
sel as to due date of return does not constitute reasonable cause); Smith v.
United States, 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (reliance by personal
representative on mistaken advice of counsel does not constitute reasonable
cause); Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1981) (executor has
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The Sixth Circuit, despite its earlier holding in Fisk, has for
the most part also accepted the Duttenhofer rationale, but in a tem-
pered way. In Estate of Geraci 188 the court affirmed the tax court's
conclusion that the taxpayer's reliance on counsel did not consti-
tute "reasonable cause," but did so because the findings of the
record were not clearly erroneous.' 8 9 The tax court's determina-
tion regarding the taxpayer's passivity was criticized, 190 and the
court expressed sympathy for the plight of the taxpayer who was
put in such an untenable position.' 9 ' Nonetheless, the "passiv-
ity" viewpoint of Duttenhofer seemed to be acceptable to the court.
Subsequently, however, in Bank of Benton v. United States,' 92 the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
although finding in favor of the IRS, interpreted Geraci as strongly
indicating that "reliance upon advice of counsel, under proper
circumstances, can constitute reasonable cause for delayed filing
of an estate tax return."' 193 While the Benton court admitted that
the status of this issue in the Sixth Circuit is unclear,' 94 and made
reference to taxpayer successes when the Geisen tests were met, 95
personal, nondelegable duty to file timely return and reliance on mistaken ad-
vice of counsel is not sufficient to constitute reasonable cause).
188. 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974).
189. Id. at 1149 (citing In re Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d 358, 359 (6th Cir.
1953)). The Geraci court stated that "although we affirm, we do so unenthusias-
tically." Id. The court noted that the burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate
that the failure to timely file a return was due to reasonable cause. Id, The court
stated that absent such a showing, the court is required to impose the additional
tax. Id.
190. Id. In addition, the court recognized that the executrix was a house-
wife with little or no business experience, and indicated that criticizing her for
her passivity was unwarranted under the circumstances. Id.
191. Id. at 1150. The court stated: "Although we are sympathetic with the
plight of the executrix and would have preferred that the IRS have [sic] settled
this matter at the administrative level and thereby avoided a harsh result, we
cannot reverse the decision of the Tax Court on the record before us." Id.
192. 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,582 (W.D. Ky. 1984).
193. Id. The court indicated that "proper circumstances" exist where "in-
experienced taxpayers, unaware of the need to file a return or at least the date
the return is due, select a competent tax expert, supply the tax expert with all
the necessary information and rely upon the expert to timely file any necessary
returns." Id. The court noted that, in Benton, the executor was a bank whose
trust office was aware that a federal estate tax return would be necessary. Id. In
fact, the trust office was aware that it could obtain a filing extension. Id. These
factors outweighed the fact that the bank had a small trust office that handled
only a few estates. Id.
194. Id. The court stated: "Although there is no clear resolution of the
question in the Sixth Circuit, there are strong indications that, in this Circuit,
reliance upon advice of counsel, under proper circumstances, can constitute rea-
sonable cause for delayed filing of an estate tax return." Id. (citations omitted).
195. See Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200 (1967), aff'd,
410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (neither litigation against estate nor
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there is nothing concrete in the opinion to grasp onto as strong
support for a pro-taxpayer position. Perhaps if the taxpayer in
Benton were not a professional executor a different result would
have been reached, but there is no clear indictation as such. The
Sixth Circuit could probably comfortably be placed in the camp
with those circuits which have adopted the harder line position. 196
C. A Walk Through the Seventh Circuit
The history of the "reliance on counsel" issue within the Sev-
enth Circuit is sufficiently interesting to warrant separate exami-
nation. The decisions have been diverse, if not, at times, patently
inconsistent. This is the circuit that produced Geisen,197 albeit on
the trial level, on the one hand, and Knoll v. United States, 198 one of
the most frequently cited anti-taxpayer holdings, on the other.
Almost all of the judicial frustration in wrestling with this issue
can be found in opinions of this circuit. By tracing cases up to
Boyle, itself a Seventh Circuit case, the full scope of the problem is
brought into focus.
In the relatively early case of Commissioner v. American Associa-
tion of Engineers Employment, Inc.,i99 the Seventh Circuit took its
lead from the pre-Millette Fifth Circuit and followed the position
laid down in Burton Swartz Land Corp. v. Commissioner.20 0 In Engi-
neers Employment, it was stipulated that taxpayer's counsel was a tax
specialist with significant experience in the tax field. 20 1 Based
upon counsel's opinion, a corporate tax return was not filed.20 2
executor's reliance upon attorney constitute reasonable cause); Estate of Geraci
v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir. 1974) (executrix's inexperience in
business and her reliance on her attorney's mistaken belief as to period for filing
return constituted reasonable cause), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
196. See Boyle v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 687, 691 n.5 (1985). The
Supreme Court stated:
Although at one point the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that reli-
ance on counsel could constitute reasonable cause ... the Sixth Circuit
appears now to be following those courts that have held that the tax-
payer has a nondelegable duty to ascertain the deadline for a return
and ensure that the return is filed by the deadline.
Id. (citations omitted).
197. Geisen v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973). For a
discussion of this case, see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
198. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
199. 204 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1953).
200. 198 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1952).
201. 204 F.2d at 20. The court found that counsel for the corporate tax-
payer had specialized in federal taxation for more than 25 years. Id. In that
time, the attorney had been counsel in more than 100 tax cases in the Supreme
Court and other federal courts. Id.
202. Id. The tax court found that the taxpayer's attorney had submitted a
558 [Vol. 31: p. 525
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The court noted that a reputable and experienced attorney would
not render an opinion without possessing all of the necessary
facts. 203 It then concluded that the taxpayer had done all that
could reasonably be expected and eliminated the penalty. 20 4 The
case clearly falls into the category of finding reasonable cause
when reliance on counsel is used to determine whether a return is
due. 20 5 But the court's view that counsel would not normally pro-
ceed without sufficient information is noteworthy. It is the first
instance of a court putting the onus on the putative expert, tax
counsel, to do the job he was hired to do. The court permits the
presumption that if counsel made the decision he took all the nec-
essary steps a trained professional would take, including ob-
taining all relevant information. The implication is that a
taxpayer can meet his obligation by merely following instructions
and complying with requests and need not actively inquire into
the needs of counsel. Thus, the court seemingly holds that pas-
written opinion to the taxpayer in which he advised the taxpayer that the corpo-
ration was exempt and therefore not required to file federal tax returns. Id.
In court, a witness who had been associated with the corporate taxpayer for
25 years testified that no corporate tax return was filed because he and the cor-
porate taxpayer were advised by their counsel that a return was not required. Id.
at 21. The witness also testified that he thought that counsel had stated this
opinion in writing, but the alleged written opinion could not be found. Id.
While the court noted that the testimony as to the written opinion was
"rather meager," the court also stated that "there was no denial of it in any
way." Id.
203. Id. Counsel for the IRS contended that the attorney's opinion could
be held to be no more than an "informal opinion," and as such, should not have
been relied upon by the taxpayer. Id. In support of this opinion, counsel noted
that the alleged written opinion of the taxpayer was not produced as evidence
and that there was no evidence submitted as to what information the taxpayer
had given to the attorney. Id. The court, however, held that whether the attor-
ney's opinion was written or verbal, it would not have been rendered by an ex-
perienced tax attorney unless the attorney was in possession of the
determinative facts. Id.
204. Id. The court cited the Second Circuit's decision in Haywood Lumber for
the proposition that "[wlhen a corporate taxpayer selects a competent tax ex-
pert, supplies him with all necessary information, and requests him to prepare
proper tax returns, we think the taxpayer has done all that ordinary business
care and prudence can reasonably demand." Id. (citing Haywood Lumber &
Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 1950)). For a further
discussion of Haywood Lumber, see supra notes 88-111 and accompanying text.
205. See Boyle v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985). In Boyle, the
Supreme Court held that a taxpayer's failure to make a timely filing of a tax
return is not excused by reliance on an agent of the taxpayer. Id. However, in
deciding Boyle, the Court recognized that reliance upon an attorney as to
whether a return was due could constitute reasonable cause. Id. at 693 (citing
Engineers Employment, 204 F.2d 19; Burton Swartz, 198 F.2d 558).
For a further discussion of Boyle, see infra notes 285-308 and accompanying
text.
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sivity is not inconsistent with the exercise of ordinary and prudent
care.
Another taxpayer victory followed in Geisen,206 which, nota-
bly, did not rise to the appellate level. Shortly thereafter, how-
ever, the Seventh Circuit reversed its sails and charted a new pro-
government course in Kroll v. United States.20 7 Kroll involved a
knowledgeable taxpayer (the executor had a college education,
one year of law school, and broad business experience) who en-
trusted the administration of the estate, including the filing of tax
returns, to an experienced tax attorney. 208 The executor received
notice from the Government that the return was overdue, yet the
return was not filed until some ten months later.20 9 Based upon
these facts the court had little difficulty in holding that the tax-
payer had not exercised ordinary and due care and thus had failed
to establish reasonable cause. 210
The more important aspect of Kroll is the rationale and tenor
of the decision rather than the specific holding. Although Kroll's
district court opinion was not published, it appears that the Geisen
test was applied by the trial court in its finding for the taxpayer.
21
'
206. Geisen v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1973). In Geisen,
the court held that for a taxpayer to meet the "reasonable cause" standard, he
must: 1) be unfamiliar with tax law; 2) have made a full disclosure of all relevant
facts to counsel; and 3) have exercised ordinary business care and prudence. Id.
at 35-36. For a detailed discussion of Geisen, see supra notes 117-22 and accom-
panying text.
207. 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1977).
208. Id. at 394-95. The taxpayer had filed his own income tax returns for
many years. Id. The taxpayer had also worked with a large industrial company
and a brokerage firm. Id. at 394.
209. Id. at 395. The return was due on October 13, 1965. On January 9,
1969, the IRS sent a letter to the taxpayer advising him that no return had been
filed. Additionally, the letter informed the taxpayer of possible methods of
avoiding the potential tax penalty. After the taxpayer informed his attorney of
the notice from the IRS, the attorney sent a letter to the IRS, as well as a copy of
the letter to the taxpayer, informing the IRS that the return would be filed by
April 1, 1969. Id. at 395-96. However the return was not filed until October 27,
1969. Id. at 395.
210. Id. at 396. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's con-
clusion that the taxpayer had relied, in good faith, upon his attorney. The Cir-
cuit court stated that the taxpayer knew he had not signed an estate return nor
written a check to pay the tax despite the fact that the taxpayer was aware of both
of these obligations. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayer must have real-
ized that the return had not been filed by the April 1 deadline as had ben prom-
ised to the IRS. Id.
211. Id. at 395. As was previously noted, the Geisen test consists of three
conditions, all of which must be met before the taxpayer is considered to have
had "reasonable cause." Geisen v. United States, 369 F. Supp. at 36. For a list of
these conditions, see supra note 206. For a detailed discussion of Geisen, see
supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/3
RELIANCE ON COUNSEL
The appellate opinion noted the lower court's finding that the
taxpayer (1) made full disclosure to his attorney, and (2) did not
possess estate tax expertise-two of the three conditions of the
Geisen test. 2 12 The question of whether complete compliance with
Geisen would have permitted elimination of the penalty was never
answered. The court noted that the executor had received actual
notice of the return's due date (a violation of the third condition
of the Geisen test) and failed to file before the maximum penalty
accrued.21 3 The court could have based its holding on the simple
fact that since the Geisen tests had not been satisfied, the taxpayer
failed to establish reasonable cause. Instead, it went two steps
further. First, it adopted the Ferrando-Duttenhofer position that the
executor's duty to file an estate tax return is personal and nondel-
egable, 214 but limited its application to those situations where
there is no question that a return is due.21 5 Second, it noted that
to the extent Geisen was inconsistent with this position, that case
was incorrect. 21 6 Accordingly, Geisen would still be applicable to
those factual settings where reliance on counsel led taxpayers to
212. 547 F.2d at 395. Although the first two conditions of the Geisen test
were met, the Seventh Circuit in Kroll stated that "[t]he sole issue is Kroll's
knowledge of the filing date and his failure to file on time." Id. This is the third
condition of the Geisen test. For a discussion of the Geisen test, see supra note
206.
213. For a discussion of the taxpayer's failure to timely file, see supra notes
209-10 and accompanying text.
214. See Duttenhofer, 410 F.2d at 306; Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 589. For a dis-
cussion of Ferrando, see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Duttenhofer, see supra notes 153-67 and accompanying text.
215. 547 F.2d at 396. The Kroll court stated:
Whether or not the taxpayer is liable for taxes is a question of the tax
law which often only an expert can answer. The taxpayer not only can,
but must, rely on the advice of either an accountant or a lawyer. This
reliance is clearly an exercise of ordinary business care and prudence.
Id.
The court then proceeded to distinguish the question of whether a return is
required from the question of when the return is due. Id. With respect to the
latter issue the court held:
An entirely different situation is presented where a penalty is assessed
because a return, although filed, is filed after the due date .... any
layman with the barest modicum of business experience knows that
there is a deadline for the filing of returns and knows that he must sign
the return before it is filed. If, in addition, the taxpayer in a given case
knows the exact date of the deadline, then the failure of his attorney or
accountant to present him with the return for his signature before that
date must put him on notice that reliance on the attorney or accountant
is not an exercise of ordinary business care and prudence.
Id.
216. Id. at 397 n.3. For a detailed discussion of Geisen, see supra note 117-
22 and accompanying text.
1986]
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believe, in error, that no return was due, thus triggering satisfac-
tion of all of the Geisen tests. The court accepted reliance on
counsel as reasonable cause in such cases, citing with approval
Hatfried and Burton Swartz, but made clear that it did not read
them as authority for the permissibility of "abdication of respon-
sibility for the timely filing of a return admittedly due." 2 17
Since Kroll limits successful "reliance on counsel" arguments
to those instances where the advisor speaks only to the necessity
of filing a return, it could be concluded that this defense to the
assessment of delinquency penalties would almost never be avail-
able. 218 Such a conclusion is warranted if Kroll is viewed in con-
junction with those cases imposing an affirmative duty on the
executor to ascertain the due dates of any returns required to be
filed on behalf of the estate.2 19 Only in those instances where the
estate attorneys were basically ignorant of the law could abate-
ment of the penalty be had.2 20
Those who thought Kroll represented the Seventh Circuit's
abandonment of "reliance on counsel" as reasonable cause were,
however, quickly forced to reconsider when the court decided
Rohrabaugh v. United States.221 Rohrabaugh was an appeal from
summary judgment granting the taxpayer a refund of assessed
penalties. The undisputed facts included, predictably, a relatively
unsophisticated executor unfamiliar with both estate and tax mat-
ters who entrusted the administration of the estate to her attor-
ney.22 2 The taxpayer made full disclosure of all material matters
217. 547 F.2d at 397 (citing Burton Schwartz, 198 F.2d 558; Hatfried, 162
F.2d 628).
218. See Kroll, 547 F.2d at 397. The Kroll court held that "[i]n the cases
holding that no penalty may be imposed because of good faith reliance on coun-
sel, the question was whether a return had to be filed." Id.
219. See, e.g., Estate of Lillehei, 638 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1981) (executor's
duties include ascertaining due date of estate tax return and seeing that attorney
files return on time); Millette & Assoc. v. Commissioner, 594 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.)
(responsibility for assuring timely filing belongs to taxpayer), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 899 (1979). For a further discussion of Millette and Lillehei, see supra notes
181-87 and accompanying text.
220. See Kroll, 547 F.2d at 396. The court states that whether a taxpayer is
liable for taxes, and thereby required to file a return, is a question of law. The
Kroll court further states that often this question of whether to file can only be
answered by an expert (i.e., an attorney or an accountant), and concludes that,
on this question of whether to file, the taxpayer is justified in relying upon the
attorney or accountant. Therefore, if the attorney or accountant informs the
taxpayer that no return is necessary but the court determines that the attorney
was mistaken and that a return was required, the taxpayer will not be liable. Id.
221. 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979).
222. Id. at 212. The taxpayer was a high school graduate but had no col-
lege or other advanced education. The taxpayer worked as a receptionist tele-
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to her attorney and inquired of his progress, but never knew the
exact due date of the estate tax return. 223 In affirming the deci-
sion to grant summary judgment the court offered some interest-
ing observations.
First, and perhaps foremost, was the Rohrabaugh court's abil-
ity to distinguish Kroll and conclude that it was correctly decided.
The controlling distinction was the fact that in Kroll the executor
had actual notice of the due date of the return whereas that
knowledge was absent in Rohrabaugh.224 The court was willing to
apply the Geisen tests to determine whether the taxpayer exercised
ordinary care,225 and refused to view Kroll as establishing a per se
rule prohibiting reliance on counsel from ever giving rise to rea-
sonable cause. 226 Unfortunately, despite the fact that it down-
played Kroll, the court never addressed the Kroll holding
regarding the executor's personal, nondelegable duty to ascertain
the due date of and file the estate tax return. This major omission
forces one to question whether the court truly believed Kroll
could be reconciled with decisions permitting executors to avoid
delinquency penalties for entrusting counsel to file tax returns.
The court's reading of the Kroll footnote 227 that dismisses Geisen
phone operator at a hospital and had no experience in business matters. The
law firm hired by the taxpayer had prepared her father's tax returns for many
years, and the attorney handling the administration of the estate had been prac-
ticing in the field of tax law for almost thirty years. Id.
223. Id. The taxpayer had never before acted as a personal representative
of an estate. The court stated that the taxpayer had "frequently discussed with
[her attorney] the progress and status of the probate proceedings." Id. The
attorney continually assured the taxpayer that estate matters were progressing
accordingly. In fact, upon the attorney's realization of his failure to file the fed-
eral estate tax return, he informed the taxpayer of the oversight and admitted
responsibility for the error. Id. at 213. The return was finally filed three months
and one day after its due date. Id.
224. Id. at 216. The court stated that "the Kroll case is clearly distinguish-
able from the present situation... the taxpayer here had no business experience
that would reveal to her that there is a deadline for the filing of estate tax re-
turns." Id. The court noted that, even more importantly, "the taxpayer in this
case had no knowledge of exactly when the return was due." Id.
225. Id. The Rohrabaugh court found Geisen to be factually distinguishable
from Kroll. Id. (citing Kroll, 547 F.2d 393; Geisen, 369 F. Supp. 33). In fact, the
court contended that Geisen was factually on point with Rohrabaugh, as both Geisen
and Rohrabaugh involved inexperienced taxpayers who had no knowledge of
business affairs or of the filing deadlines for the returns. Id. The court pointed
out that the taxpayer in Rohrabaugh filed within four days of learning of his fail-
ure to timely file, while the taxpayer in Kroll took 10 months to file after learning
of the return's due date. Id.
226. Id. at 217.
227. See Kroll, 547 F.2d at 397 n.3. For a further discussion of the Kroll
court's interpretation of Geisen, see supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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as being incorrectly decided is quite strained. 228 This again raises
the question of whether the court was more concerned with find-
ing a way to sustain the trial court because its decision seemed
fair, than with applying the harsh rule which the circuit had appar-
ently adopted only a few years earlier. 229 In all, one did not walk
away from Rohrabaugh with the sense that the Seventh Circuit had
assumed the pro-taxpayer stance.
A second notable feature of the Rohrabaugh opinion is the
court's refreshing outlook on the practicalities at play in the exec-
utor-counsel relationship, and the problems associated with draw-
ing technical distinctions that might not exist. 23 0 There is little
question but that the court was quite sympathetic to the plight of
the inexperienced executor who seems to be at the mercy of the
estate attorney. What can the executor be realistically expected
to do beyond furnishing all necessary information requested and
inquiring of the progress being made? The court believed such
action is sufficient to pass an "ordinary care" test.231 Addition-
ally, in this setting, the court was hard pressed to differentiate
between obtaining technical advice pertaining to whether a return
is due from having the counsel actually do the filing, if necessary.
If the attorney undertakes the task to prepare and file a return,
should an inexperienced executor unaware of when the return is
due be held not to have exercised ordinary care in relying on
counsel's performance merely because the job to be done does
228. 611 F.2d at 217. The court interpreted Kroll's reference to Geisen as
simply stating that, "to the extent that Geisen was subject to an interpretation
that reliance upon counsel for timely filing would always constitute reasonable
cause," the Kroll court could not agree with Geisen. Id. (Emphasis in original).
229. In Rohrabaugh, the court distinguished Geisen from Kroll on its facts. Id.
at 216. However, it is clear that the Kroll court disapproved of the Geisen three
part test because it was contrary to the nondelegable duty theory. Kroll, 547
F.2d at 395. In Kroll, the circuit court held that the trial court's finding that two
of the three parts of the Geisen test were met was irrelevant, stating that "neither
fact plays a role" in its decision in Kroll. Id.
230. 611 F.2d at 212. The court did not focus on whether the taxpayer had
ordered counsel to file all necessary returns, only on whether she had made full
disclosure of all relevant facts and papers to her attorney. Id. Recall that in the
past the court had focused on the fact that the taxpayer had not directed counsel
to file all necessary returns when supplying the relevant information. See Lam-
merts, 456 F.2d at 683. For a further discussion of Lammerts, see supra notes 168-
80 and accompanying text.
231. 611 F.2d at 214. The court stated that the conduct of the taxpayer
would seem to meet any reasonableness standard, but in particular, that the tax-
payer's conduct did meet the reasonable cause standard in that there was no
"willful neglect." Id. In support of this finding, the court emphasized the inex-
perience of the taxpayer and her diligence in selecting a competent tax special-
ist. The court also emphasized that the taxpayer had kept in close contact with
the tax specialist even after supplying the necessary information. Id.
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not entail receipt of advice on a technical matter? The court
thought not, but did not go so far as to indicate that abdication of
responsibility could give rise to a favorable finding for the tax-
payer.232 The executor, it seems, must do more than merely turn
over the administration of the estate to the lawyer, a position con-
sistent with the Geisen tests. In essence, the court apparently rec-
ognized that executors obtain counsel for the purpose of assisting
in the administration of the estate. 23 3 When the assistance in-
cludes tax work the executor should be able to expect counsel to
carry through on these matters as well. But, although the execu-
tor should not be expected to do counsel's work, he must to some
degree satisfy himself that the work is being done. It is these lat-
ter practicalities that appear to provide the foundation for the
court's approach to establishing "reasonable cause." 23 4
A third interesting aspect of Rohrabaugh is the court's willing-
ness to distinguish the executor's plight from that of other tax-
payers. In the opinion is a discussion of the penalty provision and
its objective.235 Reference is made to Helvering v. Mitchell,236
where the United States Supreme Court noted that a purpose of
the penalty provisions is to protect revenue and to "reimburse the
Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss
resulting from the taxpayer's fraud." 23 7 The Rohrabaugh court
noted that such considerations are inapplicable to a situation
232. Id. at 219. The court stated that it did not "condone ... a complete
abdication of the responsibility of the taxpayer to keep in touch with his coun-
sel." Id. Rather, the court required the taxpayer to acquire a competent tax
expert and supply the expert with the necessary information. Id.
233. See id. at 213. The court in Rohrabaugh noted the role played by coun-
sel in the sale of farm land owned by the estate and other efforts made by coun-
sel in an attempt to aid the administration of the estate. Id.
234. See id. at 214. The court emphasized that the taxpayer "maintained
contact with [the attorney] from time to time during the administration of the
estate." Id. Also, the court observed that it did not appear that the Government
was claiming "willful neglect" by the taxpayer. Moreover, the court distin-
guished the filing of an estate tax return from that of an income tax return on
the basis of the widespread media efforts to give notice of the due date of in-
come tax returns. Id.
235. Id. at 218 (citing Plunkett v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 644, 650 (1st
Cir. 1941)). In Plunkett, the court noted that if a return is executed properly and
filed before the deadline, no penalty will be assessed, even if the Government
subsequently finds the return to be incorrect as to the amount of taxable in-
come. 118 F.2d at 650.
The penalty assessed by the Government equals five percent for each full
month (or any part thereof) that the return is late. 611 F.2d at 218. The maxi-
mum penalty, however, is 25%. Id. For a further discussion of the lateness
penalty, see supra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
236. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
237. Id. at 401. The Mitchell Court stated: "The remedial character of
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where the return is late but any prospect of fraud or cost of Gov-
ernment investigation is absent, 238 as the revenue base is suffi-
ciently protected by the interest due for the delinquency
period. 23 9 Aside from the issue of matching the penalty with the
evil, the court was mindful of the potential "Pandora's box" that
can be opened by permitting taxpayers to use dilatory counsel as
a shield from monetary loss. But the court was satisfied that its
decision would not encourage delinquent returns since the
favorable result in the opinion is limited to narrow facts.240
Moreover, counsel filing late returns because of their own errors
face embarrassment and repercussions from angry clients, which
may perhaps lead to self-monitoring and limit the number of de-
linquencies. Such a view is probably overly idealistic, but this
should not detract from its underlying soundness. The bottom
line is that an executor is in a different position from many other
taxpayers. He is not inculcated with information regarding estate
tax return requirements, as income tax filers are with regard to
their responsibilities. The Rohrabaugh court points out this dis-
tinction, 24 1 and notes that the regulations themselves permit the
type of tax involved to be taken into account when determining
whether a taxpayer has exercised ordinary care. 24 2 It seems rea-
sonable that an executor ought not to be presumed to have the
same knowledge concerning estate taxes that individuals have
sanctions imposing additions to a tax has been made clear by this court in pass-
ing upon similar legislation." Id. at 401 (footnote and citations omitted).
238. 611 F.2d at 218. The court noted that "[tihe record does not even
indicate that the Service was aware that there would be a tax owing in this es-
tate." Id. The court also noted that there was not interference with the ongoing
work of the IRS. Id.
239. Id. The Rohrabaugh court stated: "While it is true, insofar as protecting
the revenue was concerned, that the revenue came in after it was due, . . . it was
accompanied by interest for the period of delinquency." Id.
240. Id. at 219. The court limited the holding to situations in which the
taxpayer retains a competent tax expert, supplies the tax expert with all neces-
sary information, and requests the tax expert to prepare all necessary tax re-
turns. Id.
The court also noted that the expenses of litigation would discourage tax-
payers and counsel from becoming careless with respect to the filing deadlines.
Finally, the court pointed out that even if the taxpayer is not required to pay the
lateness penalty, he still must pay interest on the amount of tax owed, and the
interest begins to run from the day the return is due. Id.
241. Id. at 214. For a further discussion of the differences between income
tax filers and estate tax filers, see supra note 234 and accompanying text.
242. 611 F.2d at 218 n.2 (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(2) (1984)).
The Treasury regulations provide: "[Iun determining if the taxpayer exercised
ordinary business care and prudence in providing for the payment of his tax
liability, consideration will be given to the nature of the tax which the taxpayer
failed to pay." Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(2) (1984).
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with respect to income taxes. The latter is a highly publicized an-
nual event, the former in many instances is a once in a lifetime
experience and occurs at a time when the executor may, because
of the death of a loved one, not be operating at his or her usual
level of efficiency.
The failure to mention the seeming adoption of the execu-
tor's nondelegable, personal duty standard is an interesting omis-
sion. Even the dissent sidestepped its application, and instead
proferred a principal-agent theory to impute the attorney's negli-
gence to the executor and thereby prevent a finding of reasonable
cause. 243 The dissent suggests that the majority opinion all but
sanctioned dilatory filing and thereby "blunted the salutory ob-
jective of the penalty statute." 244 Of greater interest is the ex-
pressed concern over the majority's immunization of negligent
attorneys from malpractice actions, 245 since by abating the pen-
alty the prospective plaintiff-executor has suffered no harm and
therefore has no recoverable damages. The dissent's hard line
approach is effectively towing the Ferrando-Duttenhofer246 line
presented in Kroll; but this should not come as a surprise since the
dissenting judge was the only member of the Rohrabaugh panel
who also decided Kroll.247
The strength and persuasiveness of Rohrabaugh was quickly
243. 611 F.2d at 219-20 (Swygert, J., dissenting). The dissent presumed
the taxpayer to be "of normal intelligence and aware of her civic responsibili-
ties." Id. The dissent also presumed that had she not hired an attorney she
would have been held liable for her failure to make a timely filing of the tax
return. Id. at 220 (SwygertJ., dissenting). The dissent noted that the taxpayer's
sole excuse was her reliance upon her attorney, and that this reliance "proved to
be faulty." Id. Therefore, the dissent concluded that this reliance could not be
"characterized as a reasonable cause" for her late filing. Id.
244. Id. The dissent stated that "taxpayers and their attorneys will hereafter
realize that they shall likely suffer no adverse consequences by late filings of
estate tax returns." Id.
245. Id. The dissent stated that "the court has indirectly but effectively im-
munized a negligent attorney from what appears to be an open and shut mal-
practice suit." Id. The dissent went on to state that "[plublic police
considerations should militate against such immunization." Id.
246. See Duttenhofer, 410 F.2d at 306; Ferrando, 245 F.2d at 589. In Ferrando,
the court recognized an executor's nondelegable duty to file the estate tax re-
turn. 245 F.2d at 589. This nondelegable duty theory was adopted by the court
in Duttenhofer. 410 F.2d at 306. For a further discussion of Ferrando, see supra
notes 133-42. For a further discussion of Duttenhofer, see infra notes 153-67 and
accompanying text.
247. See Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 211; Kroll, 547 F.2d at 393. In Kroll, the
panel included Judges Moore, Swygert, and Tone. 547 F.2d at 393. Rohrabaugh
was decided by Judges Castle, Pell, and Swygert. 611 F.2d at 211.
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tested. In Fleming v. United States,248 a district trial court inter-
preted Rohrabaugh very narrowly, holding against the taxpayer de-
spite the similarity of its facts to that case. 249 The court
proceeded to distinguish the cases, but the tenor of the opinion
clearly indicates a preference for the Kroll rationale of an execu-
tor's personal, nondelegable duty to file tax returns, suggesting
that the court would have followed Kroll even if a distinction
could not have been made.250 There can be no doubt of the
court's belief that the Kroll principle is correct. This conclusion is
supported by the view that despite the burden imposed upon a lay
executor to oversee his attorney's activities, the burden is insuffi-
cient to overcome the risk of potential loss of revenue and ineffi-
cient tax collection.25 1 The court was satisfied that neglect or
inattentiveness, regardless of which is the true culprit, should not
be allowed to increase the Government's time and expense of col-
lecting taxes. 252
In reviewing Fleming, the circuit court reaffirmed Kroll as the
authoritative case on the issue of reliance on counsel as reason-
able cause. 253 Citing Kroll extensively, the court noted all of the
248. 483 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aff'd, 284 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.
1981).
249. 483 F. Supp. at 287. As in Rohrabaugh, the executor in Fleming had no
previous experience as a personal representative. Id. at 285. Also, the executors
in both cases relied completely on counsel to prepare and file the returns, and
received assurances that all was in order. Id. The only difference appears to be
that the executor in Fleming had been informed of the due date of the return. Id.
Apparently the district court felt that this fact placed the case squarely within the
Kroll rationale. Id. at 287.
250. Id. With regard to the factual distinction, the court noted: "Even if the
plaintiff here did not file the return on time because he relied upon the estate's
attorney to file for an extension" there was no reasonable cause. Id. The court
stated that it was "bound by the holding in Kroll and will follow and apply this
rule in the present case." Id. The Fleming court then noted that "[t]here is a
sound and valid reason to impose upon the executor the 'personal, nondelega-
ble duty' of promptly filing a request to extend the time for filing estate tax
returns." Id.
251. Id. (citing Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943)). In Spies,
the Court stated that "taxpayers' neglect or deceit may prejudice the orderly and
punctual administration of the system as well as the revenues themselves." 317
U.S. at 495.
252. 483 F. Supp. at 287. The United States Supreme Court also addressed
this problem in Spies. There, the Court stated:
The United States has relied for the collection of its income tax largely
upon the taxpayer's own disclosures rather than upon a system of with-
holding the tax from him by those from whom income may be received.
This system can function successfully only if those within and near taxa-
ble income keep and render true accounts.
317 U.S. at 495.
253. See 648 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1981).
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key language recognizing certain executor duties that cannot be
entrusted to estate counsel. 254 The court did not, however, go so
far as to adopt a per se rule precluding reliance on counsel from
ever constituting reasonable cause, but did limit those instances
to situations where the pivotal issue is whether or not a return has
to be filed. 255 Interestingly, the taxpayer in Fleming tried to navi-
gate into that safe harbor but to no avail.256
In a stirring dissent, it was posited that since the taxpayer was
informed by counsel that by filing an application for an extension
one would be automatically granted, there was reliance on a legal
opinion sufficiently similar to involve the exception to Kroll.257
Moreover, the dissent stated that there is no case of record which
requires a client to supervise his attorney. 258 Satisfied that the
majority failed to demonstrate any specific act which an ordinary
and prudent individual would not have done, or would have done
differently, the dissent concluded that the court was in effect sanc-
tioning an undeserved windfall for the governmenf.25 9
254. Id. at 1125-26 (citing Kroll, 547 F.2d at 396-97). For a discussion of
Kroll, see supra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
255. 648 F.2d at 1127. The Seventh Circuit stated that "following the deci-
sion of this court in Kroll, we hold that . . . where the taxpayer knew that an
estate tax return must be filed... he [has] a personal nondelegeable duty to see
that . . . the return [is] filed." Id.
The court acknowledged that the attorney in Fleming was likewise negligent
in not filing for an extension of the return or advising the taxpayer of the tax
laws concerning the filing of an estate tax. However, the court ruled that the
attorney was an agent of the taxpayer and that the taxpayer was charged with his
agent's knowledge or lack of it. Id.
256. Id. The taxpayer argued that he did not know when the return was due
because his attorney misinformed him of the due date. Id. The court stated that
the taxpayer had a nondelegable duty to file an application for an extension and
to ascertain that the extension had been granted. Id. at 1126-27.
257. Id. at 1127 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that Kroll was
distinguishable because in Kroll the taxpayer had never signed the tax return
which he knew was required, whereas in Fleming the taxpayer was not required to
personally sign the application for the extension of time. Id. at 1128 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the taxpayer could reasonably rely on
his attorney to perform this simple, ministerial function. Id.
258. Id. at 1128 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the
attorney informed the taxpayer that the extension application had been filed. Id.
The only way the taxpayer could have discovered that the application was not
filed would have been to inquire of the attorney's secretary or determine person-
ally whether the attorney's signature was in fact on the documents. Id.
259. Id. at 1129 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Justice Cudahy said:
[H]ere, the majority points out no specific in which the taxpayer has not
acted with "ordinary business care and prudence." Those instances re-
lied on by the majority, majority opinion at 1125, all pertain to matters
as to which the taxpayer could reasonably rely on his attorney's "legal
opinion." Under these circumstances, the imposition of heavy penal-
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Boyle v. United States260 proved to be the capstone case of the
circuit. Executor Boyle retained competent counsel to handle the
administration of his deceased mother's estate.2 6 1 Boyle knew a
tax return would be due, but was not informed of and did not
inquire of its due date.2 62 The taxpayer 1) was not knowledgea-
ble in the estate field, 2) cooperated with counsel, and 3) inquired
into counsel's progress regarding the estate tax return.263 Ulti-
mately, counsel informed Boyle that due to a clerical error the
estate tax return had not been filed, and was by that time overdue.
Within a week thereafter Boyle met with counsel again, and a re-
turn was filed. 264 The Government assessed the delinquency pen-
alty, and in the action brought by Boyle to obtain a refund both
parties moved for summary judgment.265 Relying on Rohrabaugh,
the district court found for Boyle. 26 6
The Government appealed, arguing both that Rohrabaugh was
a minority viewpoint, and that Boyle could be distinguished from
that case.2 67 As to the former argument, the Government pointed
to Kroll and Fleming as representative of the majority view, and
also cited Ferrando, Millette, and Lillehei in support of this posi-
tion. 268 With regard to the latter argument, the Government con-
ties is a windfall to the government adding to the widespread belief in
the unfair and arbitrary nature of much government procedure.
Id. (citation omitted).
260. 710 F.2d 1251 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985).
261. 710 F.2d at 1251-52. The attorney hired by the taxpayer had prac-
ticed as an attorney for over 20 years, specializing in the real estate and probate
fields. Id. at 1252.
262. Id. The attorney informed the taxpayer of the taxpayer's obligation to
file a federal estate tax return during their discussions. Id.
263. Id. The court noted that the taxpayer "relied solely on his attorney for
instruction and guidance." Id. The court also added that there was no evidence
that the taxpayer had been untimely in providing his attorney with any informa-
tion or records. Id.
264. Id. The taxpayer learned of the clerical error upon phoning his attor-
ney to check on the progress of the return. Id. The error had been a result of an
omission of the taxpayer's case from the attorney's personal calendar. Id.
265. Id. The additions totaled $18,451.01, $1, 326.56 of which was interest.
The taxpayer paid the penalty and filed a claim with the IRS for a refund. The
IRS failed to act upon the refund request so the taxpayer brought this action in
district court. Id.
266. Id. (citing Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d 211). For a discussion of Rohrabaugh,
see supra notes 221-47 and accompanying text.
267. 710 F.2d at 1253. For a discussion of the Government's arguments,
see infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
268. Id. (citing Kroll, 547 F.2d 393; Fleming, 648 F.2d 1122; Ferrando, 245
F.2d 582; Millette, 594 F.2d 121; Lillehei, 638 F.2d 65). Each of these cases stand
for the per se rule that reliance on counsel does not constitute reasonable cause
within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 6651(a)(1) (1985).
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tended that Boyle had substantially more business experience
than the taxpayer in Rohrabaugh, and thus should be held to a
higher standard of ordinary business care. 269 On a final note, the
Government argued that to permit the taxpayer to prevail would
encourage executors to remain ignorant in their roles presumably
for the purpose of avoiding possible delinquency penalties.2 70
In sustaining the trial judge's conclusion, the court had little
difficulty dismissing the Government's arguments and allaying its
fears. 271 In distinguishing the facts of Kroll-type cases, the court
emphasized that Boyle never had actual knowledge of the due
date of the return. The fact that Boyle had more business experi-
ence than the Rohrabaugh executrix was considered insignificant.
Since Boyle did not have extensive tax return filing experience an
inference that he should have known that the return had to have a
filing deadline was not warranted.2 72 Moreover, if holding the
taxpayer to a higher standard of ordinary business care was justi-
269. 710 F.2d at 1253. Recall that the taxpayer in Rohrabaugh was a high
school graduate with no business experience and no previous experience as a
personal representative of an estate. 611 F.2d at 212. In Rohrabaugh, the court
made particular note of the taxpayer's inexperience and emphasized that she
had no knowledge of the time requirements for the filing of a tax return. Id.
Based on these facts, the taxpayer in Rohrabaugh met the first of the three neces-
sary conditions, that she was unfamiliar with the tax law. Id. at 215. The court in
Rohrabaugh also required the taxpayer to make full disclosure of all relevant in-
formation to her attorney and to exercise ordinary business care and prudence.
Id. The Rohrabaugh court then concluded that, due to the taxpayer's constant
contact with her attorney and the taxpayer's inexperience in business matters,
she had exercised ordinary business care. Id. at 214.
In Boyle, the taxpayer had acted as an executor once before (20 years earlier)
and had served as president of a corporation for approximately 30 years. 710
F.2d at 1252 n.2. Based on this experience, the Government contended that the
taxpayer in Boyle was more experienced and thus distinguishable from the tax-
payer in Rohrabaugh. Id. at 1253.
The Seventh Circuit in Boyle noted this factual distinction but held that it
was insignificant. Id. The court emphasized that there was no evidence that an
estate tax return was required when the taxpayer had previously served as an
executor. Id. at 1252 n.2. Also, the court noted that, while the taxpayer had
signed tax returns when acting as president of a corporation, accountants and
auditors had been responsible for preparing and actually filing the returns. Id.
270. 710 F.2d at 1253. The court cited the Government's argument that
"[a]n attorney may well avoid giving such information even where the executor
does make an inquiry, since it would be not only in the estate's best interest, but
also the attorney's own interest to keep the executor uninformed of this crucial
matter." Id. The court in Boyle rejected this argument for two reasons. First, as
was noted in Rohrabaugh, the executor can obtain an extension in order to obtain
immunity and, therefore, does not need to remain ignorant. Id. (citing
Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d at 219). In addition, the court noted that reasonable cause
implicates a case-by-case analysis and, therefore, it is "foolish" for an executor
to rely on possible judicial relief. Id.
271. Id. at 1253-54.
272. For a discussion of the taxpayer's experience, see supra note 269.
1986]
47
Morris: Reliance on Counsel as Reasonable Cause: To the Back Burner after
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1986
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
fled in the circumstances, the court found that by hiring and
maintaining close contact with competent counsel, any such stan-
dard had been met.273 With regard to the contention that
Rohrabaugh was a minority view and should be overruled, the
court, through an analysis of the facts and language of the "ma-
jority" cases, demonstrated the consistency among them.2 74 Of
particular importance was Boyle's ignorance of the due date of
the return and the prompt action he took upon learning of it,
facts not present in Kroll or Fleming.275 The court made clear that
the Seventh Circuit had never decided that reliance on counsel
was per se not reasonable cause, despite the Government's persis-
tence in obtaining that holding.2 76
As to the Government's attack on Rohrabaugh as "bad law"
potentially dangerous to future timely revenue collection, the
court enunciated an enlightened response. First, it noted that
Rohrabaugh adopted a case-by-case approach in applying any stan-
dards for determining "reasonable cause." 277 Thus, it would be
unreaslistic to assume executors would purposefully be dilatory
under the belief Rohrabaugh would protect them from penalties.
As support, the court noted that there had not been a "flood of
lawsuits involving late filings of tax returns" 278 since Rohrabaugh.
273. 710 F.2d at 1253 (in support of the finding that the taxpayer had exer-
cised reasonable cause). The court stated that the taxpayer "hired competent
counsel soon after his mother's death and cooperated fully with [the attorney].
Furthermore, [the taxpayer] maintained contact with his attorney and did not
simply abandon the estate once he had delegated the legal functions." Id.
274. Id. (citing Kroll, 547 F.2d 393; Fleming, 648 F.2d 1122). The court dis-
tinguished Boyle in that the taxpayer in Boyle did not know the due date for filing
of the return, while the taxpayers in Kroll and Fleming did know of that due date.
Id. The court further distinguished the cases in that in both Kroll and Fleming the
taxpayer was informed of the missed deadline but did not take timely or effective
action to cure the problem. Id. at 1253. In Boyle, on the other hand, the tax-
payer filed an effective return just one week after learning of the failure to file.
The court stated that this demonstrated "ordinary business care and prudence,"
and that "any suggestion of willful neglect was negated." Id.
275. 710 F.2d at 1253.
276. Id. at 1254 (Coffey, J., concurring). Judge Coffey stated that "whether
reasonable cause exists is, of course, primarily a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the trier of fact from all of the facts and circumstances in a particular
case." Id. (citing Estate of DiRezza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 19 (1982) (citations
omitted)).
277. 710 F.2d at 1253. For a further discussion of the applicable standards
of reasonable cause, see supra note 270 and accompanying text.
278. 710 F.2d at 1254. The fear of an excessive number of law suits over
belated returns was first addressed by the dissent in Rohrabaugh. 611 F.2d at 219
(SwygertJ., dissenting). The majority in Rohrabaugh listed a number of factors it
felt would prevent this excessive number of suits. 611 F.2d at 219. The court
stated that taxpayers who were intentionally delinquent were still not protected.
Id. The court also cited embarrassment to attorneys and accountants upon late
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The language and tenor of the concurring opinion is equally
refreshing. There it is noted that whereas simple passivity will
not permit a finding of "reasonable cause," it is unrealistic to ex-
pect executors to make specific inquiries of due dates or dead-
lines.2 79 Clients ought to be able to expect professional counsel
to perform the duties for which they were hired, and the concur-
ring opinion adopts this position suggesting that codes of profes-
sional ethics impose such an obligation on them. 2 80
Pursuing a contrary path in another strong dissent, the "per-
sonal, nondelegable duty" theory was again articulated. 28' The
dissent questioned whether the majority had in fact sanctioned
executor passivity, a viewpoint condemned by others. 282 Of par-
ticular concern seemed to be the nagging fear that negligent
counsel will go unpunished if taxpayers continue to prevail. 283
The legitimacy of such a concern must be questioned. One might
returns as a factor which would help keep the number of delinquent returns
down. The court also noted that litigation over the reasonable cause issue can
become quite expensive and that this would discourage belated filings. In addi-
tion, the court recognized that interest runs on the original tax from the date the
return was due even if the taxpayer avoids the penalty. Finally, the court noted
that the burden of proving reasonable cause is still upon the taxpayer. Id.
279. 710 F.2d at 1255 (Coffey, J., concurring). Judge Coffey states: "No
decision of this court, or any other circuit court, has ever held that asking a
single magically worded question (the exact due date) is the determining factor
in cases such as this." Id. Judge Coffey also stated that it is "neither practical
nor realistic to require a taxpayer to specifically inquire as to the exact filing
date, to supervise his attorney's every move, or to, in essence, personally per-
form those tasks he has entrusted his professionally retained legal counsel to
complete." Id.
280. Id. The concurrence noted that the Illinois Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility requires that the attorney file estate tax returns within the allotted
time period. Id.
281. Id. at 1256 (PosnerJ., dissenting).
282. Id. at 1257 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Lammerts, 456 F.2d 681 (2d
Cir. 1972) ("simple passivity" could not excuse executor from relying on attor-
ney or accountant)). The dissent agreed that if Boyle had asked the attorney
when the estate tax return was due and the attorney misinformed him, then
there might be reasonable cause. However, by not so inquiring, Boyle was
deemed to be passive and to have failed to establish reasonable cause for the late
filing. Id.
283. Id at 1258 (Posner, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
If [the taxpayer] were required to pay the penalty that the Internal Rev-
enue Service assessed, he might well, as I have suggested, have a .mal-
practice claim against his lawyer, whose admitted negligence was the
primary cause of the late filing. Liability would thus come to rest on the
person whose fault was primarily responsible for depriving the Internal
Revenue Service of its due. In this way proper incentives would be cre-
ated to avoid a persistent problem in the enforcement of the tax laws.
Instead the court today adopts an approach that rewards both the ac-
tive negligence of the lawyer and the passive negligence of his client.
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respond with the inquiry, "Is it preferable to penalize the inno-
cent taxpayer?" Interestingly the dissent hinted that it might
have found "reasonable cause" if Boyle had asked counsel for a
due date and was misinformed. 28 4 Presumably then the taxpayer
would be relying on "expert advice," which if incorrect could pro-
vide the basis for reasonable cause. Such a position may be
founded on quicksand. Can one realistically distinguish counsel's
failure to file on time from providing an inaccurate due date?
The practicalities dictate that counsel is retained to do the job
correctly. Should the fact of whether his failure to meet that obli-
gation stems from negligence in filing or negligence in research-
ing a due date be determinative of sanctions to be imposed on the
client? Attempts at such distinctions crystalized the need for a
better working rule on the subject.
D. Boyle v. United States
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Boyle
to end the conflict among the circuits concerning whether the "at-
torney reliance" argument could shield executors from delin-
quency penalties. 28 5 There can be no misreading of the Court's
intention to put the quietus on the issue by establishing the gen-
eral bright line rule 28 6 that reliance on counsel does not consti-
tute reasonable cause for tardy tax return filings. 287 Although
retaining counsel to assist in estate administration is prudent, this
284. See id. at 1257 (Posner, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that it did
not believe that the taxpayer's constant contact with his attorney as to his pro-
gress was sufficient to satisfy a reasonable cause determination. Id. The dissent
stated that "Boyle could not simply close his eyes and ears" as to the deadline
and "still be found to have used 'ordinary care and prudence.' " Id. at 1258
(Posner, J., dissenting).
285. United States v. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687, 688 (1985).
286. See id. at 692. The Court stated that "[t]he time has come for a rule
with as 'bright' a line as can be drawn consistent with the statute and implement-
ing regulations." Id. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court emphasized that
fixed deadlines are essential if the Government is to oversee millions of taxpay-
ers. The Court proceeded to state that, under a system of self-assessment in
initial tax calculations, deadlines must be enforced by a "rigid standard" other-
wise the Government would risk allowing a "lax attitude toward filing dates." Id.
287. Id. The Boyle Court emphasized that "Congress intended to place
upon the taxpayer an obligation to ascertain the statutory deadline and then to
meet that deadline." Id. The hiring of an attorney is an exercise of "ordinary
business care and prudence" as prescribed in the regulations. Id. (citing Treas.
Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (1984)). However, the Court stressed that "ordinary
business care" is not the determinative question in this case. Id.
The Court held that while it may be reasonable for a taxpayer who hires an
attorney to expect the attorney to comply with the deadlines in filing the returns,
this fact does not relieve the executor from his obligations under the statutes.
Id. The Court stated that "Congress has charged the executor with an unambig-
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in and of itself is not dispositive of the reasonable cause issue.
The Court followed a Ferrando tack, stressing that it is the execu-
tor's duty to file the return, and that this obligation is not met by
merely retaining counsel and assuming he will perform all the
jobs (including filing returns) he was hired to do.288
Whereas the Court tacitly adopted the "nondelegable duty"
theory it apparently rejected (or would not apply) a pure princi-
pal-agent rationale for imposing late-filing responsibility even
though it did use principal-agent terminology. 28 9 This distinction
seems important for without it "attorney reliance" could never
constitute "reasonable cause" to the principal-taxpayer who
would always be imputed with the agent-preparer's negligence.
The Court recognized, however, that under certain circumstances
following the advice of counsel can constitute reasonable cause
for avoiding penalties. Such is the case if the advice is technical in
nature, e.g., whether or not a return is due at all. 290 This appears
to be an acceptance of the Hatfried-Haywood rationale, as applied
in McCouglan, Collino and Christ.29 1 But its application is limited to
reliance on substantive advice. The Court was generally unwill-
ing to extend the protection to executors fulfilling non-technical,
procedural functions such as filing duties, as some of the circuit
courts were wont to do. 29 2 In certain instances however, some
protection would be afforded by the Court. Specifically, if an ex-
ecutor who was incapable of exercising ordinary care relied upon
counsel, reasonable cause might be found. The Court pointed
uous, precisely defined duty to file the return within nine months" and the tax-
payer cannot pass this duty off to the attorney. Id. at 692-93.
288. For a discussion of relevant aspects of Ferrando, see supra notes 133-40
and accompanying text.
289. 105 S. Ct. at 693. The Court held that "when an accountant or attor-
ney advises a taxpayer on a matter of tax law, such as whether a liability exists, it
is reasonable for the taxpayer to rely on that advice." Id. (emphasis in original).
The court reasoned that "[t]o require the taxpayer to challenge the attorney....
or to try to monitor counsel on the provisions of the Code... would nullify the
very purpose of seeking the advice of a presumed expert in the first place." Id.
(citing Haywood Lumber, 178 F.2d at 771).
290. See id.
291. See Haywood, 178 F.2d 769; Hatfried, 162 F.2d 628; McCouglan, 10
B.T.A. 958; Collino, 25 T.C. 1026; Christ, 54 T.C. 493. Hatfried and Haywood are
the cases frequently cited for their use of the "attorney reliance" theory in ex-
cusing taxpayers from paying delinquency penalties. For a discussion of Hatfied
and Haywood, see supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
292. See, e.g., Rohrabaugh, 611 F.2d 211 (no penalty where inexperienced
taxpayer, unaware of time requirement for filing return, relied on attorney); In re
Fisk's Estate, 203 F.2d 358 (taxpayer's reliance on attorney to file timely return
constitutes reasonable cause); Haywood, 178 F.2d 769 (reliance on advice of
counsel or expert accountant in good faith is reasonable cause).
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out that the requisite incapacity would probably be a disability
sufficient in itself to constitute reasonable cause for a delinquent
filing, and as such, resort to a reliance on counsel theory would be
unnecessary. 293 Nonetheless, the argument could be made. The
underlying premise adopted by the Court is that a taxpayer
should not be held accountable for circumstances beyond his
control.294
Crucial to the pro-Government result reached by the Court is
its view that no degree of tax expertise is required to know that
tax returns have due dates.295 Once cognizant of the necessity to
file, the executor must affirmatively act to ascertain the due date
of the return, and see that it is met.2 9 6 These are basic executor
duties for which the executor remains responsible even if he dele-
gates their actual performance to another. Consequently, when
the filing duty is not properly performed because of a delegate's
error, it does not constitute reasonable cause and the executor
remains liable. 29 7
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan expressed his
agreement with the view that ordinary care and prudence require
some affirmative action to determine deadlines and see that they
are met. 29 8 These executorial responsibilities cannot be dele-
gated to counsel with impunity. However, picking up on some of
293. 105 S. Ct. at 692 n.6. The Court stated:
The principle underlying the IRS regulations and practices-that a
taxpayer should not be penalized for circumstances beyond his con-
trol-already recognizes a range of exceptions which there is no reason
for us to pass on today. This principle might well cover a filing default
by a taxpayer who relied on an attorney or accountant because the tax-
payer was, for some reason, incapable by objective standards of meet-
ing the criteria of "ordinary business care and prudence." In that
situation, however, the disability itself could well be an excuse for a late
filing.
Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 693. The Court held that "one does not have to be a tax expert
to know that tax returns have fixed filing dates and that taxes must be paid when
they are due." Id. The Court emphasized that deadlines are "implied" in tax
returns and that taxpayer reliance on attorneys "cannot function as a substitute
for compliance with an unambiguous statute." Id.
296. Id. The first duty of the personal representative of an estate is to iden-
tify and collect all of the decedent's assets and to determine the tax obligations
of the estate. Id.
297. Id. at 693-94. The Court noted that "it requires no special training or
effort to ascertain a deadline and make sure that it is met." Id. at 693. In fact,
many executors perform many of the probate functions themselves, without
soliciting the aid of either an attorney or an accountant. Also, executors occa-
sionally conduct probate proceedings without the assistance of counsel. Id.
298. Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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the exceptions noted by the majority, Justice Brennan took care
to stress the fact that only an "ordinary person" could be held to
this standard. 299 The opinion suggests that an incompetent or
infirm individual might not be able to meet the responsibilities of
an executor. To the extent a disability renders an executor
"physically and mentally [in]capable of knowing, remembering,
and complying with a filing deadline," he should not be held to
the usual standard of care.300 Again, there is the strong flavor of
exculpability for circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control.30'
Justice Brennan suggested that in such instances perhaps the stat-
utory interest charge 30 2 on the late payment would be penalty
enough, without imposition of the harsh costs of § 6651(a) (1).303
The concurrence also noted that the bright line rule adopted by
the Court will apply with equal effect to personal income tax re-
turns; and although not stated, presumably will govern reason-
able cause determinations based on attorney reliance theories for
all other taxes as well. 30 4 Perhaps because of this broad sweep,
299. Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring). The concurrence noted: "The
government itself has eschewed a bright line rule and committed itself to neces-
sarily case-by-case decisionmaking. Id. The gravamen of IRS's exemptions
seems to be that a taxpayer will not be penalized where he reasonably was unable
to exercise ordinary business care and prudence." Id. (emphasis added).
300. Id. The concurrence stated that: "Although the overwhelming major-
ity of taxpayers are fully capable of understanding and complying with the pre-
scribed filing deadlines, exceptional cases necessarily will arise where taxpayers,
by virtue of servility, mental retardation, or other causes, are understandably
unable to attain society's norm." Id.
Because, however, the taxpayer in Boyle was fully capable of meeting the
required standard of ordinary business care and prudence, the concurrence did
not reach the question of the circumstances under which a taxpayer who
presents evidence of his inability to comply with the required standard would be
entitled to relief from the penalty. Id.
301. See id. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring).
302. See I.R.C. § 6601(a) (1985). This section provides that interest shall
be charged on any amount due that is not paid on or before the last date pre-
scribed for payment. Id.
303. 105 S. Ct. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing 26 U.S.C.
§§ 6601(a), 6651(a)(1) (1985)). Section 6651(a)(1) provides for the "reasonable
cause" exception to penalties for delinquent returns. Id. For a further discus-
sion of § 6651(a)(1), see supra notes 7-27 and accompanying text.
304. 105 S. Ct. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Seventh Circuit has
since cited this aspect of Justice Brennan's concurring opinion and held that
relying on a bank to file a Form 5500-C annual return does not constitute rea-
sonable cause for failure to file the return on time. Alton OB-Gyn, Ltd. v.
United States, 57 A.F.T.R.2d (P.H.) 1279 (7th Cir. 1986). In Alton, the taxpayer
established employee benefit plans and designated the First National Bank and
Trust Company of Alton as the plans' trustee. Id. at 1280. In 1977, the taxpayer
failed to timely file the required Form 5500-C Annual Return, paid the late filing
penalty assessed by the Commissioner, and filed a suit for a refund. Id. On
appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the taxpayer argued that its reliance on the bank
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Justice Brennan felt compelled to emphasize that such a strict rule
ought not to be blindly applied in every and all instances. As was
noted, "efficiency should yield to other values in appropriate
circumstances." 30 5
One walks away from the Boyle decision with some uneasi-
ness. On the one hand, the clear rule has been set: reliance on
counsel will not constitute reasonable cause for a delinquent tax
return filing. On the other hand, if the advice relied upon is that
a return was not due at all, such advice is seemingly substantive in
nature and provides a basis for reasonable cause, if and when the
misadvice is discovered and a required return is ultimately
filed. 30 6 Moreover, there may be certain instances where a tax-
payer will be unable to comply with the standard, perhaps leading
to more tempered outcomes. Cases of particular interest in this
latter category may include situations where counsel erroneously
advise taxpayers as to the due date of the return, and after follow-
ing that advice delinquent returns result. The Court specifically
noted the problem and the conflicting resolutions which have
been provided by the courts, but eschewed the opportunity to de-
cide the matter. 30 7 As stated by Justice Brennan in his concurring
opinion, "the Court has expressly left this issue open for another
day." 30 8
IV. ROOM ON THE RANGE
A. Footnote Nine Incapacity
Has the Court left enough loose ends for taxpayers to tie to-
gether to form a net which will prevent their fall into the abyss of
hired to administer the benefit plans to file the returns on time was reasonable,
and that the Supreme Court's opinion in Boyle did not control because Form
5500-C was an informational return and no tax was due. Id. Citing to the con-
currence in Boyle, which makes it clear that Boyle "will apply with full force to the
personal income tax returns of every individual who receives an annual gross
income of $1,100," the Seventh Circuit held that "every individual is required to
file a return without regard to whether any tax is due." Id. at 1280 (citing Boyle,
105 S. Ct. at 695).
305. 105 S. Ct. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of when
reliance on counsel is justified, see supra note 290 and accompanying text.
306. See 105 S. Ct. at 693.
307. Id. at 693 n.9. The majority stated that "courts have differed over
whether a taxpayer demonstrates 'reasonable cause' when, in reliance on advice
of his accountant or attorney, the taxpayer files a return after the actual due date
but within the time the advisor erroneously told him was available." Id. (cita-
tions omitted). However, the majority concluded, "We need not and do not
address ourselves to this issue." Id.
308. Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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non-reasonable cause? Seemingly so, at least to the extent it can
be shown that the taxpayer is incapable of meeting established
standards. Unfortunately the Court failed to identify what would
constitute such a disability, and specifically retreated from an-
swering such hypothetical questions.3 0 9 Could an aged or infirm
executor find protection under such a theory? If so, what exactly
would have to be demonstrated to permit escape from the delin-
quency penalty on this account? Additionally, what would consti-
tute the limits of the infirmity? Could a physical infirmity alone
qualify, or would more be required? Similarly, could a grief-
stricken widow or widower arguing mental paralysis as a result of
her or his loss without any corresponding physical impairment
become eligible for relief? In any event, it seems likely that the
executor would have to show, at a minimum, that the infirmity
rendered him incapable of exercising the care normally expected
of an executor. The prospects of succeeding under this theory
appear limited.3 10
Perhaps the more interesting attempt to show reasonable
cause will come from a "legal infirmity" argument: an inability to
meet the established standard because of misinformation sup-
plied by counsel. It is well accepted that if the reliance on counsel
speaks to a substantive issue and result in a non-filing (or late
filing upon discovery of counsel's error), reasonable cause will be
found.3 1 I This in a sense can be viewed as an acceptable "legal
309. Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 692 n.6. The Court did, however, refer to some
situations which the IRS considers to give rise to reasonable cause for delin-
quent returns. Id. at 689 n. 1. Those include: unavoidable postal delays, timely
filing with the wrong IRS office, reliance by the taxpayer on misinformation
given by an IRS officer or employee, death or serious illness of the taxpayer or
an immediate family member, unavoidable absence of the taxpayer, destruction
of the taxpayer's records or place of business by casualty, failure of the IRS to
furnish the taxpayer with necessary forms, and the inability of an IRS represen-
tative to meet with the taxpayer when the taxpayer makes a timely visit to an IRS
office in an attempt to secure information in the preparation of a return. Id.
(citing Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) § 4350, (24), 22-2(2) (1980)). Addi-
tionally, Justice Brennan cited "incompetence" and "infirmity" as possible qual-
ifying disabilities, but did not elaborate further on this point. Id. at 694
(Brennan, J., concurring).
310. Despite this caution, the district court in Brown v. United States excused
a late filing and abated the penalty. 57 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 143,301 (M.D. Tenn.
1985). In Brown, the federal estate tax return was filed late because the attorney
retained by the administrator to handle estate matters was hospitalized shortly
before the return was due. The court found that Boyle did not control, but in-
stead that the administrator was incapable of meeting the filing deadline and was
thus excused under a "footnote nine" rationale. Id. at 143,304.
311. The Boyle Court, for example, cites various authorities in tacitly ac-
cepting this position. 105 S. Ct. at 693 (citing Commissioner v. Lane-Wells Co.,
321 U.S. 219 (1944) (remand to determine if failure to file was due to reasonable
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infirmity." In footnote nine, the Boyle Court alluded to another
possible "legal infirmity": a delinquent filing resulting from
counsel's misrepresentation of the due date of the return.31 2 In
specifically refusing to decide this issue, the Court left unan-
swered whether such a situation would quality as reliance on sub-
stantive advice (information regarding a statutory requirement-
the filing due date) and thereby constitute reasonable cause. 313
To date, executors who have pressed forward on this point have
received mixed reactions from the courts. 314
The tax court, for example, has been somewhat sympathetic
to the misinformed executor. In Estate of Bradley v. Commissioner,31 5
the court found reasonable cause for the executor who had filed a
delinquent estate tax return within the time advised by his ac-
countant but after the due date prescribed by the statute.316 The
Government argued to impose the penalty pursuant to the Fer-
rando nondelegable duty theory. 31 7 This contention was dis-
missed on the ground that the taxpayer did not delegate his filing
cause); Commissioner v. American Assoc. of Eng'rs Employment, Inc., 204 F.2d
19 (1st Cir. 1953) (taxpayer not liable for late filing penalty when acting on ad-
vice of experienced tax attorney that taxpayer was exempt corporation); Haywood
Lumber, 178 F.2d 769 (corporate taxpayer who selects competent tax expert,
supplies expert with all necessary information, and requests expert to prepare
necessary returns has met reasonable cause standard); Hatfried, 162 F.2d 628
(taxpayer who makes full disclosure to accountant of all relevant facts and relies
on advice of accountant as to whether to file meets reasonable cause standard)).
312. 105 S. Ct. at 693 n.9. For a further discussion of the importance of
this footnote, see supra note 307 and accompanying text.
313. 105 S. Ct. at 693 n.9. The Court stated that "[w]e need not and do
not address ourselves to this issue." Id.
314. Compare Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174, 178-79 (3d
Cir. 1978) (court found reasonable cause where taxpayer filed return after dead-
line but within time advisor erroneously informed him was available) and Estate
of Bradley v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70, 72-73 (1974) (court found
reasonable cause for executor who filed delinquent tax within time advised by
accountant but after statutory deadline), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975) with
Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 742 (1st Cir. 1983) (no reasonable cause
where executor files after statutory deadline, even though filed within time ad-
vised by expert).
315. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70 (1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1975).
316. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 72. The taxpayer, an attorney, asked his account-
ant when the federal estate tax return was due. Id. at 70. His accountant mistak-
enly thought the taxpayer had inquired when the Kentucky state inheritance tax
return was due and the accountant incorrectly informed him the return was due
18 months from the death of the taxpayer. Id. The federal return, actually due
April 30, 1970, was delivered by the accountant to the taxpayer on May 28,
1970. The taxpayer mailed the return to the IRS the day he received it. Id. at
70-71.
317. Id. at 73. For a discussion of the Ferrando nondelegable duty theory,
see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
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responsibility but rather sought advice on how to properly fulfill
his duties. The court said:
To sustain respondent's argument would require a hold-
ing that an executor may rely upon the advice of an ex-
pert on substantive tax law questions but, as matter of
law, may not do so with respect to the requirements of
the law as to the due date of tax returns-tiat he must
research that question for himself. We decline to so
hold. We fail to see a significant distinction between the
reasonableness of a failure to file at all and the reasona-
bleness of a failure to file on time, where in both circum-
stances the taxpayer has relied on the advice of
competent counsel. As applied to the facts of this case,
we think respondent's argument lacks merit.31 8
After reviewing the overall record, the court had little difficulty
concluding that the taxpayer had shown reasonable cause for fil-
ing late. 319
Subsequently, in Estate of DiPalma3 20 the tax court again
abated a delinquency penalty because the taxpayer had errone-
ously relied on the advice of counsel regarding the due date of an
estate tax return.3 2' In DiPalma, the executrix was led by counsel
to believe that the return would not be due until after the legal
disputes among the estate beneficiaries were settled. 322 The
court, citing Bradley, concluded that an inexperienced executrix
"was justified in relying on her belief ' 323 as to when the return
was due.324 It also noted that the dispositive factor was not the
presence of estate litigation, but rather the actual belief that the
litigation postponed the due date of the return.3 25 This point en-
abled the court to distinguish the case from Duttenhofer.32 6
318. 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 73.
319. Id. The court stated that "taking into account all the facts of record,
we find that Arnold, as co-executor of the decedent's estate, sought to ascertain
and discharge his responsibilities with ordinary business care and prudence."
Id. (citing Lammerts, 54 T.C. at 445-47).
320. 71 T.C. 324 (1978).
321. Id. at 327.
322. Id. at 325-26. The court observed: "The executrix did not sit supinely
by and leave everything to [her attorney,] she made inquiry of him. She was led
to believe by the attorney for the estate that the pending dispute... justified the
delay in the filing of the return." Id. at 327 (citations omitted).
323. Id. (citing Bradley, 33 T.C.M. at 73).
324. Id. at 326.
325. Id. at 327 n.3.
326. Id. (citing Duttenhofer, 49 T.C. at 206-07). In Duttenhofer, the court did
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Despite the tax court's belief that the incorrect due date
problem should be given the same treatment accorded taxpayers
misinformed as to whether or not a return is due, 327 the more
recent trend has been to the contrary. Although penalizing an
executor who in good faith follows the directives and advice (al-
beit erroneous) of putatively qualified counsel is a bitter pill to
swallow, some courts have, nonetheless, prescribed this medicine.
Not surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit has been in the vanguard of
this movement. In Smith v. United States328 and Estate of Kerber v.
United States,329 attorneys incorrectly advised the taxpayers that
the estate tax returns were due one year instead of nine months
from the decedents' deaths. 30 In both instances the court found
the teaching of Lillehei controlling, and held that the taxpayers
had failed to distinguish themselves from the facts of that case. 331
The nondelegability of the duty to file a timely return carried the
day for the Government.
The same result, on somewhat different facts, came in Sarto v.
United States.332 In Sarto, the executors were led by counsel to be-
lieve that an indefinite extension of time to file the estate tax re-
turn had been obtained. 333 Taxpayer-plaintiffs argued that
because of their attorney's misrepresentation they had no actual
notice of a due date and therefore were unable to file a timely
return. 334 Although moved by the novelty of the situation, the
not consider the presence of litigation sufficient to support a finding of reason-
able cause by the taxpayer. 49 T.C. at 206-07. However, the court in DiPalma
emphasized that there was "no evidence [in Duttenhofer] that the existence of
such litigation as a possible reason for delay in the filing of the estate tax return
was communicated to the executors by the attorney for the estate." 71 T.C. at
327 n.3. It is on this point that the court in DiPalma distinguished Duttenhofer.
See id. For a further discussion of Duttenhofer, see supra notes 153-67 and accom-
panying text.
327. See Bradley, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 70; DiPalma, 71 T.C. 324. See also Estate
of Paxton, T.C.M. (P-H) 86.51 (post-Boyle case where counsel's advice that no
return was necessary constituted reasonable cause).
328. 702 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1983).
329. 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
330. See Kerber, 717 F.2d at 456; Smith, 702 F.2d at 743.
331. See Kerber, 717 F.2d at 455 (citing Lillehei, 638 F.2d 65); Smith, 702 F.2d
at 742. In Kerber, the court held that "reliance on the advice of professionals did
not provide reasonable cause to miss the deadline." 717 F.2d at 455. Similarly,
in Smith, the court held that "[the taxpayer's] reliance on his attorney did not
constitute reasonable cause for [the taxpayer's] failure to file the estate tax re-
turn within the nine month deadline." 702 F.2d at 743. For a discussion of
Lillehei, see supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
332. 563 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
333. Id. at 477.
334. Id. at 478.
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court nonetheless felt that there was insufficient justification to
depart from the Ferrando nondelegable duty principle. 33 5 The
court was unable to justify abating a penalty for an executor who
was actively misled by counsel as distinguished from an executor
who passively sat by and ended up filing late because of counsel's
neglect. Particularly vexing to the court was the thought that if
the plaintiffs prevailed, merely negligent attorneys could com-
pound their errors by actively deceiving clients as to due dates to
provide a means to avoid delinquency penalties.33 6 Although the
court may be unfairly assuming reckless behavior by tax advisors,
this does not detract from the underlying basis denying "reason-
able cause" in such instances. Executors will have to live with the
hard line view which places the onus of filing upon them.
This particular issue may ultimately be decided by the
Supreme Court,3 37 but even if it is one cannot be too optimistic
for a pro-taxpayer result. It seems unrealistic to expect so soon a
decision which could erode the strong "taxpayer duty" created in
Boyle. To allow taxpayers to avoid penalties because counsel mis-
informed them of the due date of the return may, as suggested in
Sarto, be too easy a path for tax delinquents to take to escape pen-
alty. In all likelihood the footnote nine dilemma will be resolved
at the circuit court level. Given the current climate, resolution of
the dilemma probably will not emasculate the penalty statute re-
cently given new strength by Boyle.
B. Right Place, Wrong Pot?
Have executors relying on counsel been unduly caught in the
revenue-raising net? Can there be much doubt that Boyle, decided
on the heels of a massive tax act designed to reduce the federal
deficit, 338 was to some degree influenced by the prevailing fiscal
crisis? To the extent dilatory taxpayers are a threat, or at least a
335. Id. For a discussion of Ferrando, see supra notes 133-42 and accompa-
nying text.
336. 563 F. Supp. at 478. The court stated:
If a taxpayer who had been affirmatively misled by his attorney regard-
ing the date on which his return was due could escape liability while a
taxpayer who was passively negligent could not, the ultimate result
would be that attorneys who had engaged in active deceit would escape
liability while attorneys who were merely guilty of neglect would not.
Id.
337. The Supreme Court has already twice passed up, both directly and
indirectly, the opportunity to decide this issue. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. 687 (1985);
Kerber, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984), denying cert. to 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983).
338. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494
(1984).
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bother, to the federal fisc3 3 9 there is something to be said for
adopting a strong posture against the "attorney reliance consti-
tutes reasonable cause" argument. This is especially true insofar
as the broadly based and revenue-intensive income tax is con-
cerned. Ironically, the hard line for delinquencies was drawn in
an estate tax and not an income tax setting. The estate tax does
not touch or concern most taxpayers3 40 and is of minor revenue
significance in the overall federal tax picture.3 4' By not finding
"reasonable cause" in a situation where the taxpayer was able to
make out a strong case, the Supreme Court may have intended to
serve notice that escape from filing delinquency penalties will be
strictly limited.3 42
One cannot help but wonder whether the Boyle Court has
used an elephant gun to shoot a pesky ant. There is no gainsay-
ing the fact that delinquent returns ought not to be tolerated; and
to the extent penalties minimize delinquencies and help defray
the cost of investigating and processing returns of late filers, so
much the better. But Congress saw fit to except from penalties
late returns resulting from "reasonable cause," a term officially
interpreted to mean "the exercise of ordinary care and pru-
dence." 343 Extraordinary actions were not required, just plain or-
dinary care and prudence. 344
As suggested in Rohrabaugh, reasonable cause should be de-
339. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693. In Boyle, the Court stated: "The govern-
ment has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of self-assessment in
the initial calculation of a tax simply cannot work on any basis other than one of
strict filings standards." Id. at 692.
340. Although to be phased in from the current $400,000 figure, by 1987
the transfer taxes will only be assessed on values in excess of $600,000, and
otherwise taxable transactions below that amount will not have to be reported
on a return. See I.R.C. §§ 2010(a)-(b), 2505(a)-(b) (1985) (establishing unified
credit against estate and gift taxes, which is the taxable transfer equivalent of the
dollar amounts identified above); Id. § 6018(a).
341. The transfer taxes consistently raise less than two percent of the Gov-
ernment's total annual revenue. See generally Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not
to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 265-73 (1983).
342. The tax court has seemingly taken this view. See Freeland v. Commis-
sioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 253, 256 (1986) (court faithfully cited Boyle as authority
for not abating delinquency penalty assessed on income tax return where reli-
ance on counsel was presented as basis for reasonable cause).
343. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6651(c)(1) (1984). The regulation states that:
"reasonable cause exists if the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and
prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the return within the prescribed
time." Id.
344. See, e.g., Sanderling, Inc. v. Commissioner, 571 F.2d 174, 179 (3d Cir.
1978). The court emphasized that "it is important to observe the statute uses
the words 'reasonable cause' not extraordinary circumstances." Id. (citing 26
C.F.R. § 301.6651-1(c) (1984)).
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termined with reference to the type of tax involved,345 something
apparently absent in the Boyle calculus. Given the fact that the
estate tax and any potential delinquency penalties will affect only
a handful of taxpayers, it is not surprising that most executors are
unfamiliar with, if not totally unaware of, the estate tax require-
ments. There is no estate tax equivalent of the notification effort
put forth by the Government to ensure timely filings of income
tax returns. Practically speaking, executors are left with no alter-
native other than to seek out counsel and obtain the technical
assistance to fulfill their obligations. But theory says this may be
enough. The Court has drawn a sharp distinction between ascer-
taining one's duties on the one hand and seeing that they are per-
formed on the other.a46 Whereas there might be relief from
penalty when misinformed by counsel with respect to the former,
it now is clear that "malassistance" will not constitute reasonable
cause with respect to the latter.3 47 Once an executor becomes
aware that a return is due, he basically becomes a guarantor of its
being timely filed.
Another unexplored aspect of the problem questions
whether the status of the executor-lay or professional-should
be a factor worthy of consideration.3 48 Undeniably a professional
executor, or for that matter any executor charging the estate for
his services, ought to be treated as a guarantor of performance.
Conversely, the lay executor who renders his services on a gratui-
tous basis perhaps should not be expected nor required to per-
form at the same level. It seems quite reasonable, as suggested in
Engineers Employment,349 for the lay executor to rely almost exclu-
sively on counsel, who is a paid professional, to see that all the
necessary tasks are performed. To do otherwise in a way creates a
higher standard of care for the uninformed lay executor than his
professional counterpart. The lay executor must operate on a
level beyond his accepted capabilities, while the professional need
345. 611 F.2d at 214. The Rohrabaugh court held that "on the matter of
reasonable cause, we think the type of tax would have a bearing on the matter of
ordinary care and prudence." Id. For a further discussion of Rohrabaugh, see
supra notes 215-47 and accompanying text.
346. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693.
347. Id.
348. See Estate of Cox v. United States, 86-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9595.
In Cox, the district court followed Boyle to impose a delinquency penalty but spe-
cifically noted that "a professional executor should be held to a stricter standard
than a mere layman .... " Id.
349. See Engineers Employment, 204 F.2d at 21. For a further discussion of
this case, see supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text.
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only perform within his recognized ability. Consequently, the lay
executor is forced to exercise extraordinary care; the professional
or knowledgeable executor, only ordinary care. If the lay execu-
tor cannot rely on his expert to do the job, then the inexperi-
enced, unsophisticated executor is put at a disadvantage. Surely
such a situation is unreasonable.
Although "fee versus free" may be a relevant issue, it seems
the gravamen of the problem sits not with the executors, but with
the advisors. Through negligence and ignorance, counselors
have created the issue with which their client-executors have been
forced to wrestle. The Government should consider shifting its
attack by imposing sanctions upon the attorneys, accountants,
and enrolled agents, 350 who are the true source of the delinquen-
cies. This seems a more appropriate approach to the problem
since it is unlikely that a lay executor will serve in that capacity
more than once, whereas advisors may well continue to provide
improper assistance numerous times into the future. It would not
be the first instance in which the Government has taken a step in
this direction. 351
It should not go unnoticed that Boyle may have unleashed a
damaging blow to all future claims for penalty abatements, re-
gardless of the basis for the reasonable cause asserted. Although
the opinion speaks to the attorney reliance issue, its tenor sug-
gests that only items beyond the taxpayer's control that prevent a
timely return from being filed can constitute reasonable cause. 352
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan specifically referred to
the taxpayer's "ability" versus "inability" to exercise ordinary
care as the yardstick for determining "reasonable cause." 353 This
clearly shifts the focus of the investigation and analysis. What had
originally been a burden of showing the "exercise of ordinary
business care and prudence," has been altered. Now, taxpayers
apparently must demonstrate some incapacity which prevents
350. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(a)-(c) (1985). Attorneys and accountants can be-
come authorized to practice before the IRS by merely declaring qualification in
their respective profession. Id. § 10.3(a)-(b). Non-attorneys or accountants can
become qualified to practice before the IRS by enrolling as agents. Id. § 10.3(c).
351. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b)(1), 90 Stat.
1689 (1976) (codified at IRC §§ 6694-96, 7407 (1985)). This Act created I.R.C.
§§ 6694 through 6696 and § 7407, which impose sanctions on "income tax
preparers." The sanctions may take the form of fines or injunctions against
preparers from committing further violations. See I.R.C. § 7407 (1985).
352. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 693. For a further discussion of Boyle, see supra
notes 285-337 and accompanying text.
353. See Boyle, 105 S. Ct. at 694 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a further
discussion of Boyle, see supra notes 285-337 and accompanying text.
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them from exercising that requisite care. Merely showing they ex-
ercised that necessary degree of care will be insufficient. The
ramifications of this movement may well overshadow any immedi-
ate effect that Boyle has on misinformed executors. The Court
may be signaling the requirement of a "death or dialysis" excuse
as a prerequisite to excusing future taxpayers from the delin-
quency filing penalty.
It can be counter-argued that the Boyle decision is much ado
over very little. Executors have a remedy and therefore are not
left with the ultimate responsibility of paying the penalty bill.3 54
Undoubtedly, the executor will have a cause of action against the
negligent attorney, 355 but malpractice suits are at best a secon-
dary remedy. Bringing the suit does not guarantee its successful
conclusion. Moreover, there may be additional unrecoverable
costs awaiting the injured executor. Finally, the delay in receipt
of the fruits of victory could unduly tie up the estate and need-
lessly prevent closing, thereby causing additional expense.
Would such concerns force the executor to at least consider set-
tling for less than a full recovery? If so, the estate will ultimately
bear part of the cost of counsel's failings. And if a victory is had,
additional governmental insult will probably arise when the exec-
utor discovers that although the payment of the penalty is not tax
deductible, 356 receipt of the recovery may very well be includible
354. Although the penalty is technically charged to the executor, it will ulti-
mately be borne by the estate, and derivatively by the beneficiaries thereof. The
beneficiaries could seek to hold the executor liable under a breach of duty the-
ory. It is conceivable that the "attorney reliance" defense that failed the execu-
tor on the federal penalty issue could similarly prove insufficient to provide
insulation from liability on the local level. The executor would then in turn have
to seek reimbursement from erring advisor.
355. See Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 Ill. App. 3d 368, 413 N.E.2d 47 (1980). In
Sorenson, a civil action, the court had no difficulty in finding the defendant attor-
ney liable for malpractice for his negligence in failing to timely file an estate tax
return on behalf of the plaintiff. Id. at 377, 413 N.E.2d at 56. A similar result
was had in Cameron v. Montgomery, 225 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 1975). See also
Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 742 n.2 (1983) (taxpayer's attorney reim-
bursed estate for amount of penalty); In re Estate of Remsen, 415 N.Y.S.2d 370,
99 Misc. 2d 92 (1979) (estate reimbursed for penalty).
356. Generally, only necessary administrative expenses of the estate are de-
ductible. Penalties clearly do not fall into any of the acceptable categories of
necessary administrative expenses. See I.R.C. § 2053 (1985); 26 C.F.R. 20.2053-
3(c), (d) (1986). With respect to the issue of deductibility of penalties for in-
come tax purposes, see I.R.C. 162(f) (1985) (not deductible as business ex-
pense); I.R.C. 275 (1985) (denying deduction for the payment of estate and gift
taxes themselves). See also Taggert, Fines, Penalties, Bribes and Damage Payments, 25
TAX L. REV. 611 (1970) (discussing consequences of late filing by taxpayer);
Tyler, Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy Ground, 20 TAX L. REV. 665 (1965)
(disallowance of deductions by IRS which are allowable by statute).
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in income. 357 The thought of making the executor whole is le-
gally sound, but in practice it has a hollow ring.
In sum, it is suggested that Boyle violates the spirit of fairplay,
especially when applied to lay executors. These executors, usu-
ally unaware of sophisticated transfer tax laws, will in a sense be
required to monitor the activities of advisors who have been ac-
cepted or certified as being qualified to perform the services they
are hired to do. To hold that "passivity" is not an exercise of
ordinary care is understandable, but to veritibly require the exec-
utor to actively investigate the progress of counsel ignores practi-
cality and may go beyond reason. Viewed from this perspective,
the Court's adoption of the stance that good faith reliance on
counsel does not constitute reasonable cause can be seen, at least
in the case of inexperienced executors, as imposing an unfair bur-
den on a few, while attempting to resolve the problem for many.
The voluntary compliance tax system has lost a good part of its
pliancy.
V. CONCLUSION
In deciding Boyle, the Supreme Court made clear that merely
relying on counsel to file tax returns will not constitute "reason-
able cause" to abate penalties imposed on delinquent returns.
Although the factual setting involved an estate tax, the holding
will undoubtedly extend to other taxes as well. Whereas the need
to protect revenue in these fiscally troubled times may well be a
laudable pursuit, it has perhaps been advanced at the expense of
fairness to certain taxpayers. Particularly injusticed are innocent
executors who have followed what most would consider a prudent
path by hiring putative experts to assure that the Government
357. See Clark v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939). In Clark, the court
held that the money paid to a taxpayer by an accountant to compensate the tax-
payer for extra taxes paid by him because of the accountant's error was not in-
cludible in income. Id. The Commissioner issued a non-acquiescence on this
matter. See 1939-2 C.B. 2, 4. Subsequently, in a revenue ruling, the Commis-
sioner withdrew the non-acquiescence and agreed that the recovery of an over-
payment of tax from a tax advisor because of that advisor's error is not
includible in income. See Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 C.B. 23. However, the ruling
further held that the recovery of interest and the fee paid the advisor (to the
extent previously taken as a deduction) is includible in income. This position
has recently been sustained by the IRS in a letter ruling. See Private Letter Rul-
ing 8447076 (1984). However, in Private Letter Ruling 7749029 (1977), the IRS
specifically distinguished a recovery of taxes from a recovery of "additions to the
tax" from an advisor. In so doing, the letter ruling concluded that the latter was
includible in the taxpayer's income. Although letter rulings have no preceden-
tial value, they do at a minimum indicate the Service's thinking on the matter,
and to that extent merit consideration. See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1985).
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gets it due. But the Government seems to want more. Executors
are being considered guarantors of counsel's performance; and if
counsel fails, the executor will be called upon to pay. Although
the Government has received substantial support from the Boyle
decision, there still seems to be some room for taxpayers to fash-
ion winning arguments when their reliance on counsel is the
cause of a delinquent return. Only future judicial response to
these arguments will tell whether this issue will continue to stew
or has come to full boil and is to be relegated to the back burner.
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